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Every year health expenses create severe financial hardship for 150 million peopleand force 25 million households into poverty. This is due largely to the fact that
more than three billion people—many of whom are found in the poorest half of the
world’s population—pay out of pocket for health services. They are forced to choose
between impoverishing fees or foregoing needed services, leaving them at risk of falling
into a downward spiral of sickness and poverty. 
Yet, paradoxically, in most countries around the world, the total amount of domestic
resources devoted to health is increasing at an historically unprecedented rate, in paral-
lel with growing national economies. While large amounts of time and resources have
been spent on improving the health of people in low- and middle-income countries,
not enough work has been done to help strengthen their health systems and provide
access for all to appropriate health services at an affordable cost.
Many countries are beginning to embrace universal health coverage (UHC)—
defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as “access to key promotive, pre-
ventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions for all at an affordable cost,
thereby achieving equity in access”—as a viable financing mechanism. Although mod-
els for UHC vary by country, governments are reorganizing national health systems to
share health costs more equitably across the population and its life cycle, instead of 
concentrating the burden on the few who face catastrophic illness in any given year. 
This timely report addresses a specific question: how much does it cost to shift a
health system from being predominantly financed out of pocket toward one that is
financed using schemes of universal coverage? Using examples from four countries that
have made tremendous strides toward achieving universal coverage, the report puts an
approximate price tag on these investments. The conclusions indicate that relatively
small early investments can set countries on the path toward universal health coverage.
This information should be useful to those involved in planning reform, as well as the
development partners that support them. 
For nearly a century now, the Rockefeller Foundation has been privileged to collab-
orate with leading experts and national and international organizations to tackle some
of the world’s most intransigent health problems. We are now working with those same
partners to support the transformation of health systems toward universal health cover-
age, as a strategy for improving the health and financial wellbeing of the countries and
individuals in our geographic areas of focus. I trust that this report will inform and
therefore support the champions of health financing reform and their partners.
—ARIEL PABLOS-MÉNDEZ, MD
Managing Director, The Rockefeller Foundation
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Foreword

7Aglobal movement for universal health coverage (UHC) is under way, as illustratedby an increasing number of nations working toward achieving UHC. Endorsed 
by the World Health Assembly through a resolution in 2005, UHC is defined as 
access for all to appropriate health services at an affordable cost.1 Universal coverage is 
associated with better health and equity, as well as financial protection. The systemic
resilience provided by universal coverage also contributes to poverty alleviation by
reducing catastrophic health expenditures.2
This report aims to call health leaders’ attention to the importance and enhanced
feasibility of establishing the systems and institutions needed to pursue UHC. It also
seeks to quantify the transition costs associated with reforming a health system away
from one that relies on out-of-pocket payments and towards one in which health
expenditures are more evenly distributed.
Although many countries would like to move towards UHC, the discussion is often
derailed by questions about feasibility and cost. National governments, and the interna-
tional institutions that support them, often assume that universal coverage is not afford-
able in the near term for lower-income countries. As lower-income countries grapple
with quickly rising total health spending—the result of economic development—they
face a fundamental choice. They can continue on the current path of increasingly ineffi-
cient and regressive health systems in which out-of-pocket spending for health accounts
for up to 80 percent of total health expenditures—a scenario that sends 25 million fami-
lies into poverty every year.3 Or they can pool health financing through taxation, social
protection or insurance mechanisms to cover large portions of the population.4 A grow-
ing number of lower-income countries have successfully reorganized domestic health
financing towards UHC,5 but many more remain trapped in the out-of-pocket paradigm. 
The findings described in this report suggest that the cost of transitioning towards
universal health coverage may be lower than assumed. This applies both in the expan-
sion phase and the subsequent deepening of coverage. The costing framework presented
in this report, as well as the actual dollar amounts, would be useful as a guide both for
national planners exploring health reform as well as for the international donors who
support them.
The Journey and Costs of Health System Reform 
Achieving universal coverage is a journey and cannot be achieved in a single leap.
Making progress requires investment in the foundations of universality—the institu-
tions, systems and processes that hold health systems together. Typically, countries
undertake two stages of reform toward UHC.6 In the first stage, governments set up
the foundations for broad coverage—that is, coverage that includes a limited benefits
package but that reaches a large proportion of the population (e.g., recent reforms in
Ghana). In the second stage, usually undertaken by countries at the middle-income
level, governments establish the structures and processes that enable them to deepen
coverage so that citizens who are already covered with basic care receive a more robust
package of services (e.g., recent reforms in Chile). 
Executive Summary
UHC is defined as access 
for all to appropriate health 
services at an affordable cost.
Universal coverage is associated
with better health and equity,
as well as financial protection. 
8There are three major cost components of health system reform towards UHC: 
n Health-care delivery costs (i.e., expansion of health services)
n System reform and management capacity costs
n Social and political capital costs 
The fiscal costs of expanding the actual delivery of health care services to the popu-
lation have dominated discussions of the transition to universal health coverage until
now. This is logical, since delivery costs dwarf all other costs. Nevertheless, precisely
because universal coverage is a journey, we affirm in this report that investment in 
system reform and management capacity—the foundations of universal systems—can
facilitate progress and, therefore, provide a significant return from modest investments
as compared to the service delivery costs.
This report does not focus on the cost of expanded health services, or the social and
political processes necessary to achieve reasonable consensus for reform. Rather, using
case studies from four countries or provinces that have taken different paths toward
UHC—Andhra Pradesh (India), Ghana, Chile and Turkey—this report explores in
depth the costs of the transition toward UHC. This includes expenditures such as the
creation of regulatory institutions, legal reforms related to service standards, investment
in information technology systems and continued work on developing precise proto-
cols and co-payments.
For each of the four geographical areas studied, system reform and management
capacity costs from the bottom up were identified and examined, with the assistance 
of those individuals at the center of reform during the period being reviewed. The
costs explored included:
Stewardship: The costs of designing the system and planning for its implementation,
(which often requires legislation), as well as the costs of building regulatory and pro-
gram management capacity to ensure that the system is successfully implemented.
Revenue collection mechanism: Costs such as government administration of tax 
revenues or proactive enrollment and collection of health insurance fees. 
Risk pooling: The costs of the setup, fund management and risk equalization func-
tions of the institutions, systems and processes where risk is pooled. This may happen
at the national or district level, and often requires the establishment of new institutions
outside of the ministry of health. 
Purchasing: The costs of the institutions, systems and processes that are created for
the purpose of buying health services. These costs may include ensuring minimum
quality standards of providers, contracting with providers, monitoring performance
and managing claims.
Key enablers: For instance, information technology (IT) systems, health IT cards 
that identify who is entitled to a particular benefit and who is not, and buildings and
physical infrastructure. These costs include both one-time expenses (e.g., capital costs)
and recurring ones (e.g., labor costs). 
Typically, countries undertake
two stages of reform toward
UHC. In the first stage, 
governments set up the founda-
tions for broad coverage…In
the second stage…governments
establish the structures and
processes that enable them to
deepen coverage…
9Relatively small investments
can have a catalytic effect on
health systems…
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2003-
2008 0.2
Ghana
2004-
2009 6.6
Chile
1992-
2008 0.9
Andhra
Pradesh
2007-
2009
5.1
Percent of 
public health
expenditure
Total cost 
US$ millions,
2009-adjusted
60.7
492.9
115.6
326.4
Total cost 
US$ millions,
2009-PPP
Average annual cost 
US$ millions, 
2009-PPP
168.9
705.1
243.1
422.8
Percent of 
total health 
expenditure
n/a
0.1
0.6
2.4
56.3
41.5
40.5
70.5
16 years 
6 years
6 years
3 years
Figure 1a: Costs of System Reform and Management Capacity 
Small Investments, Big Returns
The results of the costing exercise outlined in this report demonstrate that relatively small
investments can have a catalytic effect on health systems. Furthermore, in the course of
our discussions with health-system leaders, we consistently heard the message that they
wished they had devoted greater attention to these investments, precisely because of the
influence these institutions hold over all other health system expenditures.
As indicated in Figures 1a and 1b (next page), Ghana appears to have invested
approximately 6.6 percent of its public health budget (or 2.4 percent of total health
expenditure) over the six-year reform period to establish its system; the reform in
Ghana has achieved a coverage of 45 to 70 percent of the population and was accom-
panied by a subsequent decline in out-of-pocket expenditure from 55 to 35 percent of
total health spending.7 For Andhra Pradesh, the investment was 5.1 percent of the
public health expenditure over the three-year period of reform. During that time, cov-
erage was extended from 10 percent to 85 percent of the population.8
In absolute terms, approximately $20 million per year reformed and built institu-
tions and enabled systems for years to come. In both cases, public health expenditure
started from a very low base: the absolute figures over the period of reform—$115.6
million in Ghana and $60.7 million in Andhra Pradesh—can be considered modest.
Indeed, at purchasing power parity, they represent an annual investment of $40.5 mil-
lion and $56.3 million, respectively, in establishing the systems and entities that consti-
tute the foundation of universality. 
PPP—purchasing power parity
10
Recent reforms in Chile and Turkey have principally focused on deepening coverage
for their populations. In both, the system reform and management capacity investment
required was less than 1 percent of public expenditures on health, and just 0.1 percent
to 0.6 percent of total health expenditures. The example of these two middle-income
countries illustrates that deepening services to the population is a sound investment for
countries at this stage of economic development. 
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Figure 1b: Breadth and Depth of Coverage Achieved by Reforms
Universal health coverage is
perhaps more feasible today
than at any point in the past. 
1 Health insurance coverage rate estimates differ by source and are shown as ranges 
where available
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Investing to Accelerate Progress
Many factors influence the speed and success with which countries can transition to
UHC. Pressure from citizens, leadership from heads of state and the availability of a
dedicated cadre of committed champions in the ministries of finance, health and labor
all help determine when a country moves through reform. Once the decision has been
made, countries have to grapple with implementation issues and may require technical
assistance or other peer-to-peer support, such as that being offered by the new Joint
Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage, which brings together health-
financing practitioners from across the globe to share experiences and solve problems.9
Though resource constraints remain in many low- and middle-income countries,
universal health coverage is perhaps more feasible today than at any point in the past.
For some, economic development has raised the appetite and ability of emerging
economies to pursue socially progressive goals; debt forgiveness has strengthened gov-
ernment balance sheets; government has greater institutional capacity and capability 
to meet the technical requirements for transition; and empirical evidence from those
countries that have achieved universal coverage demonstrates that it is possible. 
So how should countries pay for the transition to UHC? As suggested in this report,
this additional expenditure will be only a fraction of the growing total spending in
health (approximately 2.5 percent of total health expenditures over the period of
reform) and will last only a limited period while the reforms are taking place. To the
extent GDP is growing, fiscal space may be available for governments to cover the
costs of institutional reform towards UHC. In fact, for many countries the fiscal and
political hurdles to reorganize the health system may be lower when health spending
amounts to 5 percent of their GDP than once it has reached 10 percent. Nonetheless,
the additional cost of reform may be taxing for already-stretched public budgets and
should not subtract from spending on basic health services. 
The international community has a critical role in supporting country efforts. First,
it can create awareness of the economic rationale for UHC and this historic opportuni-
ty to transform health systems in an effort to improve health and financial wellbeing.
Second, agencies such as the World Health Organization, the World Bank, UNICEF
and the International Labour Organization can offer policy guidance and technical
assistance—the topic of the 2010 World Health Report, for example, is health systems
financing for universal coverage.10 Finally, the international development community
can assist countries with the direct cost of reform from out-of-pocket expenditures to 
a new health financing platform of their choice. 
This report shows that progress is desirable, possible and affordable; it is not, how-
ever, inevitable. National governments must invest in system reform and management
capacity to pave the way for universal health coverage, and the international health
community should support them—through open commitment, technical assistance,
and financial support. Ten years ago, the World Health Report 2000 showed us how
stewardship influences everything. Today, it is clear what investment it requires to reor-
ganize domestic financing towards universal health coverage. These are smart invest-
ments; this is the time to pay the small price for progress.
National governments must
invest in system reform and
management capacity to pave
the way for universal health
coverage, and the international
health community should 
support them
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For every individual and family, health comes first. It isprecisely because of the importance of health that health
system reforms provoke fierce debate over competing
approaches, exposing the breadth of political, philosophical
and practical differences involved in this transition.
CHAPTER ONE
Where the World Stands Today: 
The Feasibility of Universal Health Coverage
13
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Universal coverage provokes controversy
and debate precisely because it represents a
new settlement reached between citizens
and government and between individuals
and their fellow citizens.16 The two univer-
sal coverage reforms that gave rise to health
system archetypes, that of Germany in
1883 and the United Kingdom in 1948,
both emerged as the manifestation of a
new social settlement. Under Chancellor
Otto von Bismarck, Germany had unified
and emerged victorious from a war with
France. Writing in 1942, British reformer
William Beveridge recognized that a sec-
ond world war just two decades after the
“war to end all wars” meant a fundamental
change in the relationship between citizens
and the state in Britain. 
Today, as the world struggles to emerge
from the financial crisis with capital mar-
kets cowed, rich countries laden with
heavy debt burdens, and fresh confidence
burgeoning in emerging economies, it is
clear that the zeitgeist has fundamentally
changed. Could this prompt new settle-
ments and usher in an age of real progress
toward UHC? At this point, it is impossi-
ble to be sure. The full effects that may
appear obvious in years to come cannot
be defined now. What is clear is that the
global economic downturn has led to an
ideological renaissance of notions of soli-
darity and social protection. There may
not be a consensus on the legitimate
bounds of government action, but public
expectations have been raised, and the
consequences are yet to play out fully. 
In the midst of these contests, it is 
possible to lose sight of common goals.
There may be strong disagreements about
the path to universal health coverage
(UHC), but its attractiveness as a destina-
tion remains undiminished among many.
The achievability of universal health cov-
erage in all countries remains an open
question, but national governments, the
World Health Organization (WHO), the
World Bank and leading health authori-
ties such as The Lancet all agree on its
validity as an objective of economic devel-
opment and social progress.
At its meeting in Geneva in 2005, the
World Health Assembly (WHA) reaffirmed
its commitment to universal health cover-
age, which it defined as “access to key pro-
motive, preventive, curative and rehabilita-
tive health interventions for all at an afford-
able cost, thereby achieving equity in
access.”11 Implicit within this definition are
the related objectives of financial protection
(ensuring that health shocks do not lead to
impoverishment) and equity (ensuring that
household contributions are based on the
ability to pay). So the reality of universal
coverage is that both breadth (the amount
of the population covered) and depth (the
quality of the health benefits package pro-
vided by the system in terms of services
provided) must be achieved.12 13 14
Since the WHA resolution in 2005, 
the world’s most populous and powerful
nations have made significant moves
toward expanding health coverage.
Premier Wen Jiaobao declared that the
most important accomplishment of the
Government of China in 2009 was its
proposal for health care reform. At the
start of the year, China’s State Council had
announced its plans, including a promise
to provide $120 billion for universal
access to primary medical care by 2011.15
India continues to see innovation at a
state and national level in health cover-
age—with a plurality of programs aimed
at broadening coverage. The year 2010
saw the United States also pass sweeping
health care reform legislation. 
Universal coverage provokes
controversy and debate precisely
because it represents a new 
settlement reached between 
citizens and government and
between individuals and their
fellow citizens. 
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Health insurance coverage rate estimates differ by source and are shown as ranges where available
Ln total health expenditure per capita
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37
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Figure 2: Health Expenditure per Capita and GDP
(with illustration of out-of-pocket spending) 
Ln—natural logarithm; PPP—purchasing power parity
Source: WHOSIS; World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund
There are underlying structural shifts
that improve the feasibility of universal
coverage. According to current estimates,
the world currently spends some $7 tril-
lion annually on health.17 As we can see 
in Figure 2, health expenditure per capita
is strongly correlated with overall GDP
per capita. As countries become more
wealthy, they devote greater resources to
health. The chart also shows how coun-
tries with relatively similar GDP per 
capita and health expenditure per capita
have significantly different spending
mixes. In particular, the level of out-of-
pocket expenditures varies dramatically.
Thus, as Figure 2 suggests, countries such
as Ghana and Rwanda have similar GDP
per capita and health expenditure per
capita, yet Ghana has a significantly high-
er level of out-of-pocket spending in
health compared with Rwanda. 
Given the strong correlation, as coun-
tries face rising expenditures, they have a
choice: they can aim to influence the mix
of health expenditure (the proportions
that are out-of-pocket rather than pre-
paid) through social protection or insur-
ance mechanisms or not.
Countries with relatively
similar GDP per capita and
health expenditure per capita
have significantly different
spending mixes…
The Desirability of Universal 
Health Coverage
Many countries have achieved universal
health coverage and many others have set
themselves that aspiration. A simple map-
ping of rates of formal health coverage is
revealing. Figure 3 shows the extent of
coverage globally; coverage rates are high
in Europe and North America, with sub-
stantial progress having been made in
Latin America and parts of Asia. Africa,
the Middle East and South Asia continue
to face low levels of coverage.
UHC is desirable because it improves
health outcomes through greater access to
health services and provides people with
financial protection against the costs asso-
ciated with illness. Health shocks,
16
UHC is desirable because 
it improves health outcomes
through greater access to health
services and provides people
with financial protection
against the costs associated 
with illness. 
Figure 3: Global Formal Health Coverage
95-100%
70-95%
40-70%
10-40%
0-10%
No data
Formal Health Coverage:
Note: International Labour Organization defined coverage as the population formally covered by social health protection (e.g., under legislation, 
without reference being made to effective access to health services, quality of services or other dimensions of coverage), explaining the depiction 
of the USA and South Africa 
Source: Data compiled by the International Labour Organization, 2008, from multiple sources; mapping by the Results for Development Institute (R4D)
through sickness, accidents or aging,
remain leading causes of impoverishment
of households in countries which lack
adequate health coverage.18 Where cover-
age rates are low or the depth of coverage
is inadequate, payments for health care
are made out of pocket. Increased spend-
ing on health care reduces income avail-
able for other purposes, can require a
depletion of savings or assets or both, 
and may shift households below the
poverty line. Universal coverage creates
risk pools that provide households with
financial protection.
By shifting to risk pooling, countries
may be able to unlock consumer savings
and provide a boost to domestic consump-
tion, unleashing new economic growth. 
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The Feasibility of the Transition
As the World Health Assembly (WHA)
definition of universal health coverage
makes clear, UHC requires broad access to
an appropriate package of care. In low-
and some middle-income countries, the
capacity of the health sector—both capital
assets and human resources—is simply too
low to achieve universal access to essential
services immediately.19 For most countries,
therefore, universal coverage must be a
journey. The experience of those countries
we have profiled demonstrates that sub-
stantial progress can be accomplished rela-
tively rapidly by investing in the proper
institutional foundations. 
The good news is that transitioning
toward UHC is more feasible today than
it was just 20 years ago. Many countries
that were once considered “third world”
are now emerging markets with greater
national wealth. The economic success of
parts of the Global South—most notably
China—has transformed both the appetite
and the ability to pursue socially progres-
sive goals such as UHC. Furthermore,
debt forgiveness has freed up government
budgets so money is available for this pur-
pose. According to the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, debt for-
giveness has led to an increase in expendi-
tures toward poverty reduction.20
Nevertheless, this should not obscure
the fact that significant resource con-
straints still afflict health systems in low-
and middle-income countries. The major-
ity of such nations face this problem,
most notably in the form of a lack of
human resources available for health ini-
tiatives.21 Many low-income countries
remain severely challenged by communi-
cable disease, and middle-income coun-
tries face a shifting disease burden toward
costly chronic disease.22
Governments now have greater institu-
tional capacity and capability to meet the
technical requirements necessary for tran-
sition. Economic growth and donor-
funded capacity-building programs have
provided greater resources. Advances in
technology are also spurring progress.
Information technology (IT) systems, for
example, improve the ability to imple-
To achieve these aims, health systems
should be able to:
n Direct resources toward appropriate services.
This means focusing on areas where
the greatest health gain is seen for what
is invested. Since universal health sys-
tems cover whole populations, they
have a strong incentive to invest in
cost-effective primary and secondary
prevention. Not every preventative
intervention is economical, but univer-
sal systems have a strong incentive to
identify and implement those that are.
n Capture scale economies. Strategic pur-
chasing of health services and procure-
ment of pharmaceuticals, medical
devices and consumables should be
more efficient than sub-scale purchas-
ing. Scale also means that management
and administration costs are spread
across a greater number of beneficiar-
ies, keeping these costs low (on a per
capita basis). 
Some health system leaders have sug-
gested that the fact of universality may
indeed strengthen political will and pub-
lic support for greater public investment
in the health sector. Above all, it means
the health sector can reap the fruits of
general economic expansion, as it ensures
that the mechanisms are in place to take
the proceeds of growth and put them
toward health investments. Having these
systems and processes in place strengthens
the hands of ministries of health when
they ask for higher priority and seek a
greater share of government spending. 
Universal health coverage is not, how-
ever, a panacea. The fact of universality
does not necessarily imply efficiency or
effectiveness. Specific design choices—
such as the level of competition or incen-
tives for innovation—can have significant
influence on system performance. There
are also risks in the transition itself. Such
large-scale change requires the expendi-
ture of great stores of social and political
capital. The transition must overcome
vested interests in the status quo, and
may be plagued by the ever-present risk
of great plans but poor implementation. 
ment reforms, help to drive down corrup-
tion, and thus ensure that resources dedi-
cated to health care are actually spent on
it. Indeed, some health system leaders
have suggested that advances in IT and
decreases in its cost have sped the imple-
mentation of UHC. 
Empirical evidence from countries that
have successfully made the transition—
across the Americas, Asia and Europe—
suggests that UHC is feasible. Economic
development alone, however, is no guar-
antee that this goal can be achieved.
Thailand, for example, has accomplished
universal coverage, while some resource-
rich countries in the Middle East have
not. Indeed, feasibility and action may be
related, but are not the same.
Financial concerns aside, another factor
fueling UHC is international policy con-
sensus in favor of this trend. National
governments from Africa to Latin
America to Asia have set UHC as their
goal. International institutions—such as
the World Health Organization (WHO),
the World Bank, the International Labour
Organization (ILO) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)—support univer-
sal coverage as a policy objective.23
Donors, including G8 countries and
global foundations, are committed to
helping countries achieve universal cover-
age.24 Many leaders in the global health
movement have rallied to the call of
health coverage for all.25
Stronger government balance sheets,
technological leaps and the power of the
example of others, combined with what
we have observed from case studies, might
even suggest that the pace of universal
health coverage reforms is accelerating. 
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When planning the transition to universal health cover-age (UHC), policymakers need to determine their
overall strategy to achieve that goal—and to understand the
costs associated with it. 
19
CHAPTER TWO
Framework for Planning the Transition 
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n Stage I: Low-Income Countries. Communi-
cable and infectious diseases are the
leading cause of illness and death.
Much of the population lacks access to
basic sanitation. Per capita spending on
health is low in absolute and relative
terms. The lack of human resources for
health services is a huge challenge. The
private sector plays a significant role in
provision. Out-of-pocket expenditures
account for around half of all spending.
The case studies from this stage include
Andhra Pradesh, Ghana, Rwanda and
Thailand at the beginning of its transi-
tion to UHC. 
n Stage II: Lower-Middle Income Countries.
Disease burden begins to shift toward
chronic disease, though communicable
and infectious diseases remain a signifi-
cant challenge for much of the popula-
tion. Per capita spending on health
remains low in absolute and relative
terms. The availability of human
resources for health is improved, but 
is still a significant problem. For this
stage, case studies include Thailand
today and Chile and Taiwan in the 
initial phases of their transition. 
n Stage III: Upper-Middle-Income Countries.
The disease burden decisively shifts to
chronic disease. Per capita spending on
health ranges from “modest” to “high,”
depending on the design choices of 
the system. Specific issues exist in the 
distribution of health professionals, 
but overall, availability is less of a 
constraint. Financing and provision
systems become more distinct. Case
studies for this stage include Turkey,
Chile, South Korea and Taiwan during
the later phases of their transitions.
n Stage IV: Advanced Economies. The disease
burden is dominated by chronic ail-
ments. There are high levels of spending
and a strong focus on cost containment,
either leading to rapidly rising spending
or rationing. The supply of health pro-
fessionals is not a major issue. Financing
and provision systems are typically split,
and universal coverage is achieved. Case
studies for advanced economies are not
examined in this report.
Different countries, and provinces within
countries, have pursued various strategies
to achieve UHC in the face of different
challenges. For those regions that have
moved toward accomplishing universal
coverage, the level of spending on health
varies enormously, as do the system design
choices and the sources of financing. Four
geographical areas that illustrate some of
these distinctive choices and challenges,
along with the costs involved, are:
n Andhra Pradesh, India n Ghana
n Chile n Turkey
Four other locations whose transition to
UHC can be more briefly examined are:
n Rwanda n Taiwan
n South Korea n Thailand
Lessons can be learned from both suc-
cesses and failures, and so the selection of
case study countries does not imply a spe-
cific endorsement of the paths nations took
or the decisions they made. In all these
cases, reform efforts have led to substantial
changes—with varying degrees of success.
Stages of Health System
Development 
The set of countries and regions described
above illustrates different system design
choices, income levels and financing
sources and mechanisms, as well as broad
geographic variety. Case studies are also
spread across the spectrum in terms of
their stages of health system development.
As Hsiao and Heller have noted,26 these
stages are typically linked to countries’
income levels. This does not imply that
progress is either uniform or linear, but
that countries of similar income levels
share challenges and their systems have
common characteristics. Furthermore, as
incomes change, so too does the disease
burden and the way health systems adapt
to address it. The stages of health system
development are identified as:
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Different countries…have
pursued various strategies to
achieve UHC in the face of
different challenges…Lessons
can be learned from both 
successes and failures…
The experiences of the countries listed
above illustrate that two unique dimen-
sions of UHC—breadth and depth—
make different requirements of their
health systems, and have different costs
associated with them. Countries typically
pursue one of two general strategies to
achieve basic UHC: 
n Broad then deep: Extending a broad
package of health services to much of
the population, then deepening cover-
age to include a greater range of inter-
ventions at higher standards over time.
Examples of this approach include
Andhra Pradesh, Chile, Ghana,
Rwanda and Turkey.
n Deep then broad: Targeting specific
groups with a relatively deep package
of services, then extending to broader
groups step by step over time until
universality is achieved. Examples of
this approach include South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand.
The actual journey is not as linear as
the description above may suggest.
Instead, general strategies—either broad-
ening or deepening—tend to dominate
over specific periods of time. Accordingly,
there are two phases of system reform and
cost management under each strategy.
When countries pursue a path of
“broad then deep,” the first phase of
broadening typically requires investment
in the initial setup of the system. In
Ghana, for example, this included the
costs of creating the National Health
Insurance Authority. In Andhra Pradesh,
it entailed the creation of the Aarogyasri
Trust, while in Turkey and in Chile, it
required the initial creation of a ministry
of health and a national health service. In
the “broad then deep” scenario, the sec-
ond phase of transition typically consists
of creating a more sophisticated set of
institutions, including payers and regula-
tors, to raise provider performance and to
thus deepen the package of services avail-
able to the population.
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For those countries that pursue the
“deep then broad” strategy, implementa-
tion progresses differently. Institutions
and mechanisms are typically created over
time for each population group that is
covered, which can lead to extensive
duplication. This characterizes the first
period, which may last many decades, as
was the case in Taiwan, South Korea and
Thailand. Thailand subsequently under-
took a second period of reform—distinct
from incremental extension by group—
that focused on consolidation to extend
coverage to the remaining uninsured and
to expand the size of the risk pool.
In most of the geographic regions that
serve as case studies, the health system
relies on multiple financing mechanisms.
Figure 4 illustrates the four core mecha-
nisms that are used for revenue collection.
Precisely because no single mechanism is
likely to provide adequate financing, low-
and middle-income countries appear to
raise revenue through a mixture of these
four approaches.
GENERAL TAXATION/
OTHER GOVERNMENT 
REVENUES
n Funding comes from the national budget, which consists of
revenues mainly from general taxation n National Health Services (NHS)
Figure 4: Health Financing Revenue Collection Mechanisms
n Contributions are made usually in the form of payroll taxes,
which make the formal workforce eligible for health services n Social security organizations
RISK-RATED AND
FLAT PREMIUMS
n Contributions are paid according to individual health risks
and usually rise with age
n Voluntary or mandatory health 
insurance systems
PERSONAL 
SAVINGS (E.G., 
OUT-OF-POCKET)
n Payments from own savings made at the point of service,
alternatively personal savings are mandated to be eligible for
coverage
n Individual health provision, personal 
medical savings program
Source: WHO, World Bank, IMF, McKinsey
Type of Collection Description Example
PAYROLL-TAX
The Transition Costs of Universal
Health Coverage: Three Pillars
Building on work from the World Health
Report 2000 and other research in the
field, it is possible to identify three pillars
of UHC transition costs: health care
delivery costs; system reform and man-
agement capacity costs; and social and
political capital costs. 
n Key health care delivery costs: 
Service provision costs. These encompass
the capital costs of additional health care
facilities such as clinics or hospitals, and
the operational costs of increased utiliza-
tion, such as labor and consumables. 
Resource generation costs. For many
countries, achieving universal coverage
would also require significant invest-
ment in human resources for health:
educating and training health care pro-
fessionals who range from community
health workers to fully qualified doctors. 
n Key system reform and management 
capacity costs: 
Stewardship costs. These are for both
the system itself (e.g., the building of
regulatory capacity) and the coordina-
tion of a reform program. 
Revenue collection mechanisms costs.
These include the cost of building rev-
enue collection mechanisms, and vary
considerably according to system
design choices. 
Risk-pooling costs. These include expenses
for the institutions, systems and process-
es where risk is pooled and managed. 
Purchasing costs. These include the
expenses of the institutions, systems
and processes that are created for the
purchasing of health services. 
Cost of enablers. Key enablers include
information technology (IT) systems;
these expenses include both one-time
costs (e.g., capital costs) and recurring
ones (e.g., labor costs). 
n Social and political capital costs: 
Social capital costs. These are the ex-
penses incurred by civil society, health
care stakeholders and the general pub-
lic in pursuing universal coverage.
Political capital costs. This is what it
costs political leaders to advance the
universal health coverage agenda at the
expense of competing political priori-
ties and with the expectation of glean-
ing political dividends. 
Achieving UHC requires investment 
in each of these three pillars. Health 
care delivery costs are by far the largest
expense involved in this transition, dwarf-
ing system reform and management costs
as governments work to subsidize those
who are covered by the system but are too
poor to make their full contribution to
overall costs. 
It is important to note that investing in
system reform and management capacity
does not imply that the full cost of an
expanded health care delivery system
must be incurred immediately. Countries
can progressively expand the proportion
of the population that is covered, and the
depth of that coverage, according to the
resources that are available. 
Furthermore, policymakers have sug-
gested that the intrinsic importance of
these system reform and management
capacity costs has been underestimated.
Many of these expenses are associated
with stewardship, as they include the
costs of establishing the principal institu-
tions within a health system, notably pay-
ers and regulators. 
The World Health Report of 2000
highlights the importance of stewardship,
noting that it “affects everything” and has
a “profound influence” on health systems’
other primary functions (defined as serv-
ice provision, resource generation and
financing). Other research has also noted
the importance of stewardship.27 In short,
these are the foundations of universality,
and investment in these institutions
enables progress.
Exploring the Foundational Pillar 
of UHC Reform: System Reform 
and Management Capacity Costs
Achieving universal health coverage is a
system reform and management capacity
issue in addition to being a challenge in
terms of financing the expansion in health
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care delivery costs. In order to understand
these costs, one must understand the com-
ponent parts of the system itself—the insti-
tutions, mechanisms and processes that
hold it together. The framework proposed
here suggests that five core elements of
cost are typically involved in universal
health coverage systems. Each of the five
elements is explored below (and summa-
rized in Figure 5).
In establishing universal health cover-
age, system stewardship takes the leading
role. This cost category includes essential
tasks such as system design—the process 
of drawing up the technical design of the
system and planning its implementa-
tion—as well as program management and
performance management to ensure that it
is successfully implemented. Stakeholder
management is an important element
here. Many UHC implementers report
that they paid little attention to this early
on in the process, especially in the begin-
ning design phase, but came to realize 
its significance later.28 Finally, where a
market system of insurers exists, there
may be the requirement for market 
regulation of private-sector participants
for consumer protection. 
Health systems require mechanisms to
be in place for revenue collection, which
is our second category of cost. This is
essential to ensure that the health system
has the necessary resources to deliver care.
In this particular element, the costs vary
considerably according to the design
choices that are made. Different systems
require very different revenue collection
mechanisms. For example, systems that
follow Britain’s Beveridge model, such as
that of Andhra Pradesh, finance the health
system through general tax revenues. As a
consequence, the only costs are those asso-
ciated with government administration, and
are therefore marginal. Systems that
require proactive enrollment and collection
of fees, such as the system created in
Ghana, demand a distributed network of
enrollment points and collection agents.
These extend the revenue collection costs. 
As health systems advance, they are able
to constitute risk pools. The particular
size of the group will vary, even in univer-
sal systems. In Ghana, for example, risk is
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pooled at the district level, while at the
national level, a central fund provides sub-
sidies to the local districts. In Taiwan, as
this nation established different payers for
different population segments, risk was
pooled at each of these segments. As these
examples illustrate, there are three compo-
nents to risk pooling: the initial setup, the
ongoing fund management and any risk
equalization functions (such as the rudi-
mentary system created by Ghana). 
In some respects, the essence of a system
is for it to collect and redistribute resources
to actors within it. Consequently, purchas-
ing is an essential element, and its costs
need to be evaluated. The first step in pur-
chasing is defining which providers are
included within the system and which are
not. This can be described as network
management. It typically requires the speci-
fication of minimum standards that
providers must meet. It also requires
understanding what costs are associated
with contracting with providers—the
process of defining what will be purchased,
at what volume and for what price. 
Once contracting has taken place,
there is a requirement for the monitoring
of performance by providers against the
specification set within the contracts. In
those systems that employ activity-based
payment mechanisms, there is the cost
associated with claims management—the
process by which providers are reim-
bursed for their work. Finally, there is an
initial setup and administration cost that is
associated with the creation of purchasing
institutions (known as payers). 
Also vital are the key enablers of health
system reforms. The first, and perhaps
most important, is information technology
(IT), as systems work on the basis of
intelligible information, generating and
demanding data in order to function effi-
ciently and effectively. A second enabler 
is the use of health cards that allow a
system where enrollment is optional to
recognize who has made a contribution
and is entitled to a benefit and who is
not. The final elements in the enablers
section are buildings and estates, which
allow the institutions that are created to
have adequate accommodation to func-
tion effectively. 
SYSTEM
STEWARDSHIP
n System design: Policy and technical investment required to define vision
for system and overall implementation plan
n Program management: Prime Minister’s Office function to coordinate
implementation of system reform vision
n Stakeholder management: Cost of engagement and communications
with stakeholders to ensure alignment behind transition
n Performance management: Creation of a performance management
function to manage relationships with elements of system
n Market regulation: Set up costs of market regulator where private 
insurance is an element of the overall solution
REVENUE
COLLECTION
n Enrollment/Collection networks: Creation of distributed network of 
enrollment/collection agents to collect contributions
n Government administration: Costs associated with implementation of
new payroll or other taxes for financing health system
RISK 
POOLING
n Fund set up and administration: Creation of a new institution to 
administer health system funds
n Fund Management: Ongoing management of funds (e.g., auditing,
accounting)
n Risk equalization: Costs of a risk equalization design, analytics 
and processes
PURCHASING
n Network management: Specifying minimum standards and determining
which providers are included within network
n Contracting: Cost of drawing up and negotiating contracts with health
system providers
n Monitoring: Creation of systems and processes to monitor provider per-
formance
n Claims management: Costs of defining claims management processes
and regulations
n Set up and administration: Administration costs of building new payer
institution (where applicable)
ENABLERS
n Information technology: Infrastructure costs to support insurance systems
n Health cards: Issuing cards to contributors to determine who is eligible
for benefits
n Buildings and infrastructure: Investment costs of office facilities
Figure 5: Framework for System Reform and Management Capacity Costs 
Source: McKinsey
One critical element of cost is 
management capabilities on the provider
side. These expenses may be specific to a 
single participant rather than specific to
the system itself. It is certainly the case
that a more sophisticated and demanding
system places stronger requirements on
the management of the provider side.
This does not, however, imply that
provider management is central to the
actual system or its capacity to function. 
It is not possible to create a framework
that covers every component of all sys-
tems. The framework above is designed to
address the main elements. For each sys-
tem, there will likely be costs that are not
in the framework, and not all costs iden-
tified by the framework will actually be
incurred. Nevertheless, this should serve
as a useful tool for policymakers as they
seek to anticipate the system reform and
management costs that they are likely 
to face as they transition to universal
health coverage. 
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CHAPTER THREE
Case Studies 
An in-depth study explored the history and systemreform and management capacity costs for four systems
transitioning to universal health coverage (UHC): those of
Andhra Pradesh (in India), Ghana, Chile and Turkey.
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Case Study
HEALTH SYSTEM REFORMS 
IN ANDHRA PRADESH
2007–2009
Context
Some 68 percent of the 82 million resi-
dents of the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh (AP) live in rural areas, reflecting
the country’s overall population. Despite
rapid rates of economic growth over the
past decade, more than 80 percent of the
people in AP live below the poverty line.29
(Andhra Pradesh uses a definition of
poverty that enables a greater-than-aver-
age share of the population, more than 80
percent, to access services available to
low-income people.) AP’s economy ranks
fourth among Indian states, with a gross
domestic product (GDP) of approximate-
ly $66 billion.30
The country of India makes the largest
contribution to the global disease burden,
approximately 60 percent of which is
from communicable diseases. In common
with India as a whole, Andhra Pradesh
faces considerable supply constraints: too
few health professionals working in too
few facilities. Andhra Pradesh possesses
four government hospital beds per 10,000
people, and less than 20 primary health
centers for every million people.31
Nevertheless, Andhra Pradesh performs
marginally better than average in India on
The aim of this analysis was tounderstand the origins of
reform, the ways in which it pro-
ceeded, the changes that were made
to the systems involved and the out-
comes that were achieved. A system
reform and management capacity
costing framework was used in
studying the first four geographical
regions. The description of costs,
however, is only an estimate. Data
was not collected systematically 
by countries, and has been recon-
structed from the bottom up. These 
estimates were made using several
methods, including in-depth discus-
sions with leaders involved in health
insurance reform in their respective
countries, a literature review and
analysis of health budgets over time
(i.e., from ministries of health, pay-
ers, regulators, etc.). Leaders were
selected based on level of involve-
ment in reform, role of involvement
in reform and willingness to partici-
pate in this study.
These estimates should give an
indication of the scale of the costs
involved. There is no claim to
absolute precision, and some ele-
ments will undoubtedly have been
missed. Nevertheless, as policy-
makers consider universal coverage
reforms, and as donors reflect on the
support they can offer, both will be
able to do so with a sense of the sig-
nificance and scale of system reform
and management capacity costs. 
Examinations of the histories (but
not the costs) for a further four sys-
tems—Rwanda, South Korea, Taiwan
and Thailand—are in the annex. 
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key health indicators such as maternal
mortality rates, under-five mortality rates
and the percentage of underweight chil-
dren. Under India’s constitution, respon-
sibility for health services resides with
state governments. 
Reform Design and 
Implementation Process
In 2007, the state government of Andhra
Pradesh embarked on a wide-ranging
health reform effort by establishing the
Aarogyasri Community Health Insurance
Scheme. The reform had the goal of pro-
viding financial protection to the poor by
lowering out-of-pocket payments and
covering tertiary care. The new scheme
was designed as a public-private partner-
ship to leverage the expertise of private
companies in areas in which the state was
limited. Star Health was chosen as the
private insurance partner to offer capabili-
ties in claims processing, risk manage-
ment and pricing.32 33
The details of the reform were proposed
by several senior bureaucrats, some of
whom went on to hold leadership positions
in the new system (i.e., of the Aarogyasri
Trust and Star Health). Other stakeholders
involved in the initial discussions included
physicians, hospital representatives, private
insurance companies and local politicians.
No legislation was required.34 The design
process proceeded without significant con-
troversy due to the backing of the chief
minister and the general sentiment that
change of some type was necessary. Patients
were supportive of free treatment, hospitals
were willing to accept more patients and
the pharmaceutical and medical device
industries welcomed an increase in the use
of drugs and consumables. 
During the design process several ques-
tions did arise, including a) how the new
government-administered and govern-
ment-funded program would be moni-
tored without a dedicated regulatory
agency; b) how, if at all, a delay in provider
reimbursement would affect provision; and
c) how to specify the conditions covered
under the program. None of these con-
cerns proved to be a major obstacle to
implementation. Difficulty in creating a
Summary: Andhra Pradesh is an Indian
state with a population of 82 million. In
2007, the state government established
the Aarogyasri Community Health
Insurance Scheme to cover all families
living below the poverty line (about 80
percent of the population). Enrollment is
automatic and the benefits package pro-
vides coverage for catastrophic secondary
and tertiary conditions. Today about 85
percent of the state population has health
coverage, increased from 10 to 15 percent
in 2006. The cost of health system reform
and management capacity was approxi-
mately $60.7 million over three years, or
5.1 percent of public health expenditures. 
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Approximately 85 percent 
of the population has been
enrolled in the program—
a dramatic broadening of
meaningful health coverage…
system to collect premiums led the gov-
ernment to choose to fund the program in
its entirety.35 Existing ID cards were used
to identify beneficiaries instead of the gov-
ernment issuing new cards.36
In 2007, the Aarogyasri Community
Health Insurance Scheme was piloted in
three districts, initially covering 173, then
330, and finally more than 900 cata-
strophic care interventions for below-
the-poverty-line families (known as
Aarogyasri I). Claims expanded dramati-
cally, from 1,000 per month during the
first three months to 1,000 per week after
six months. The following year, in 2008,
the program scaled up to include the
entire state (known as Aarogyasri II). The
benefits package was expanded to cover
942 interventions, with a financial cap of
$4,300 for services rendered to a family
in any given year.
In the three years since its inception,
approximately 85 percent of the popula-
tion has been enrolled in the program—a
dramatic broadening of meaningful health
coverage—compared to the nominal cov-
erage that existed previously. Prior to this
year, estimate government officials in the
state, 10 percent to 15 percent of the
population had some form of health cov-
erage, either through government-operat-
ed programs for civil servants or through
the private sector. 
The evolution of the health system of
Andhra Pradesh is described in Figure 6.
1 Health insurance coverage rate estimates differ by source and are shown as ranges where available 
°
Chief Minister’s 
Relief Fund 
begun to cover
hospitalization 
for the very poor 
Rajiv Aarogyasri Community Health 
Insurance Scheme I launched in three
districts covering 330 procedures 
covering below poverty line families 
Discussions 
underway to include 
senior citizens and 
pink card holders 
(those who could pay 
premiums) 
AP Urban Slum 
Health Center
Project 
establishes 192 
health centers to 
provide basic 
primary care    
National government commits 
to increasing health spend/
GDP from 0.9 percent (1999)
to 2-3 percent (2012) in 
National Rural Health Mission 
108 Services begun to 
provide free emergency 
hotline access to medical
services 
Aarogyasri II launched to cover
remaining 15 districts; covered 
procedure list expanded to 942 
and includes follow-up medical
care after hospitalization for 
one year
70 million people (85 
percent) covered by
Aarogyasri Insurance 
Schemes 
Allocation to Chief 
Minister’s Relief Fund 
increased 
2000
2005
2007
104 Advice helpline launched providing 
round-the-clock, qualified medical advice 
104 Mobile (tech-enabled care
for rural poor) and Telemedicine
(virtual medical services)
launched 
2004
2008
2010
2009
1990
Government 
hospitals receive 
technology upgrade 
(e.g., MRI and CT) 
Beginning of economic 
liberalization in India 
(with increased funding 
to the health care 
sector) 
1990
Figure 6: The Evolution of the Health System of Andhra Pradesh
Source: “Health Sector Reforms in Andhra Pradesh,” Sudhakaram; “Andhra Pradesh Health Sector Reform: A Narrative Case Study,” Results for
Development Institute; “Health Sector Reforms in India,” Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Mar 2007; “Health insurance for government
staff soon,” The Hindu; “Taking healthcare to the people”; inclusion.skoch.in; projects.dfid.gov.uk; Mohfw.nic.in
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The Aarogyasri Scheme
appears as a single program 
to patients, who have been
enrolled over time as the 
program has expanded 
throughout the state.
Lessons Learned from Pilot Phase
Lessons from the pilot project informed
the scale-up of the program, especially in
operations, information technology and
the organization of the trust.
n Information technology. As the number of
beneficiaries and claims increased, the
manual process of patient registration,
claims filing and reimbursement became
impossible to sustain. The implementa-
tion of sophisticated information tech-
nology systems was required for
providers and for the overall Aarogyasri
Scheme. The program provided com-
puters and high-speed Internet for every
network hospital and built computer
kiosks in each of these facilities. Tata
Consultancy Services was retained to
build an information technology system
that could meet the demands of the
new program from beginning to end,
managing patient registration, electronic
medical records, claims and billing.37 38 39
n Organization. The state-wide scale-up
required expanding the trust from nine
people to an institution with more
than 20 individual departments. This
included a dedicated pharmacy to
secure drugs at competitive prices. A
Rajiv Aarogyasri Medical Coordinator
(RAMCO) was appointed in each hos-
pital to be a human link between the
providers and the program. Some hos-
pitals also created subunits of the pro-
gram in their specialty departments.40 41
n Operations. The Trust and Star Health
studied the paths of patient cases to
determine how to make the system
more efficient, decrease costs and pro-
vide higher-quality care. From the pilot
program, they gained an understanding
of the cycles of hospital bed flow and
its implications for how quickly patient
information must be transmitted
between facilities. The benefits package
was refined to include precise defini-
tions and treatment mechanisms, and
procedure prices were adjusted as the
number of patients and the volume of
medical consumables being purchased
both increased.42
Key Features of Reformed System
The reformed system has several notewor-
thy features:
n Stewardship. The government of Andhra
Pradesh funds the Aarogyasri Scheme.
The Department of Health, Family,
and Medical Welfare is responsible for
basic primary care services.
n Payer structure. The Aarogyasri Scheme
appears as a single program to patients,
who have been enrolled over time as
the program has expanded throughout
the state. Operationally, the program
runs as two entities with similar but
parallel claims and billing procedures.43
44 Aarogyasri I administers the higher-
cost and higher-risk tertiary procedures
for which Star Health, the trust’s pri-
vate insurer, covers the risk. Aarogyasri
II administers the less expensive and
more frequent secondary procedures.
Here, the state of AP self-insures. 
Star Health leverages its administra-
tive expertise across both parts of the
program. Within Aarogyasri I, Star
Health performs overall fraud and cost
control. It also manages the informa-
tion technology system and employs
physicians to authorize procedures and
approve claims. Within Aarogyasri II,
physicians are trained to authorize pro-
cedures and approve claims by Star
Health but are employed directly by
the Trust.45
n Provision. The private sector plays a
dominant role in the provision of
health services. Today 72 percent of
inpatient admissions and 85 percent 
of outpatient contacts are made in 
the private sector. Public provision is
offered at multiple levels, according to
the severity of the medical need. Sub-
centers provide primary care services
including free drugs for basic condi-
tions, and there is about one center for
every 5,000 people. Primary Health
Centers (PHC) provide integrated cur-
ative and preventive health services to
rural populations. Each center has four
to six beds and serves 20,000 to
30,000 people. Patients are referred
from the PHCs to Community Health
Centers (CHC) for secondary care.
CHCs have about 30 beds and serve
80,000 to 120,000 people. From there,
patients can be referred to district hos-
pitals if necessary.51
Patients who suspect they require
secondary or tertiary medical services
can access care through several means.52
Most patients procure services through
“health fairs” where patients are
screened for conditions requiring hos-
pitalization. Each hospital within the
Aarogyasri network is required to hold
at least four health camps per month.
A total of approximately 1,000 health
camps are held every month, and
5,000 to 6,000 people attend each
camp.53 54 Alternatively, patients can be
referred for hospital care through pri-
mary health centers, the chief minis-
ter’s office or through AP’s technology-
enabled mobile health services, 104
Mobile and 108 Mobile.
n Enrollment. Enrollment in the Aarogyasri
Scheme is automatic for families living
below the poverty line,46 which in 
AP is less than 60,000 rupees (about
US$1,300) per year in rural areas 
and less than 75,000 rupees (about
US$1,600) per year in urban areas 
(the below-the-poverty-line definition 
in India as a whole is an annual 
income below 25,000 rupees or about
US$540). In 2009, about 80 percent 
of AP’s population lived below the
poverty line, and by definition, they
were all enrolled in the program.47
Beneficiaries present their identification
cards (already distributed to those living
below the poverty line for public food
distribution) to receive medical care.
n Benefits package. The benefits package
includes 942 secondary and tertiary
medical procedures, including cancer
treatment, the provision of prostheses
and organ surgeries (e.g., heart, lung,
liver and brain). There is a defined 
list of excluded conditions, including
hip and knee replacements, bone mar-
row transplants, heart and liver trans-
plants and HIV/AIDS treatments.48
Beneficiaries are also entitled to 121
follow-up procedures for one year 
after hospitalization.49
Each family is allotted two lakh
(about $4,300) per year in medical and
surgical expenses. Forty-five percent of
this expenditure goes directly to patient
care; the unused balance is pooled to
cover the cost of other patients exceed-
ing their allotment. Thirty-five percent
of the expenditure goes to incentivize
the staff providing medical services to
the beneficiaries (of that 35 percent, 
75 percent is funneled to the surgical
team, 10 percent to the investigative
team, 10 percent to the nursing staff,
and 5 percent to class IV staff and
operating-room assistants). Twenty per-
cent of the total expenditure is deduct-
ed by the Aarogyasri Trust for use in a
common revolving fund.50
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The private sector plays a
dominant role in the provision
of health services. Today 72
percent of inpatient admissions
and 85 percent of outpatient
contacts are made in the 
private sector.
n Enablers. The Aarogyasri scheme relies
on a sophisticated information tech-
nology system to record and track all
aspects of its operations. This method,
commissioned by the Aarogyasri Trust
and built by Tata Consultancy Services,
tracks patients and their electronic
medical records, records hospital bed
capacity and procedures and processes
claims and reimbursements.57 58 
This system also limits corruption 
by placing strict protocols on every
medical transaction. 
When a patient enters the hospital,
his or her picture is taken and sent
electronically, along with diagnostic
information, to physicians who pre-
authorize the procedures necessary.
Pictures are taken again during surgery,
before and after suture removal and 
at discharge. Patients must confirm
n Aarogya Mithras. Aarogya Mithras per-
form the functions of case workers and
patient educators, and are stationed at
primary health centers, in health camps
and in hospitals. They act as the face of
the Aarogyasri Scheme for patients and
are responsible for many tasks, includ-
ing publicizing the program and its
health camps, guiding referred patients
from primary health centers to hospi-
tals. They also maintain the Aarogyasri
help desks at each hospital, verifying
the benefits and documentation of
each patient, and facilitating the dis-
charge of the patient.55 56
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Expenditures 
Administration and
operational expenses (e.g.,
Aarogya Mithra salaries) 
Income
Payment of claims to 
network hospital 
Government of Andhra 
Pradesh 
Interest on fund 
Star Health and Allied 
Aarogyasri Health Care Trust Official Development Assistance 
Health camps 
Payment of claims to 
network hospital 
Administration and
operational expenses
ICT partner (Tata 
Consultancy Services) 
Insurance
Figure 7: Financial Flows in the Andhra Pradesh Health System 
Source: “eHealth India 2009 Award for Government/Policy Initiative of the Year” eHealth Awards; “MoHMFW and Aarogyasri Health Care
Insurance Scheme: Norms for billing and guidelines for utilization amounts received by the government hospitals;” aarogyasri.org; “Andhra Pradesh
CM for nationwide implementation;” thetribuneindia.com
that the service was appropriately deliv-
ered before the hospital is 
reimbursed. Despite this system,
instances of corruption exist, 
including falsified white identification
cards and the performance of 
unnecessary procedures.59 
n Financing. The state government of AP
covers the entire cost of the Aarogyasri
Scheme, receiving no direct funding
from the government of India for this
purpose.60 61 62 The financial flow is
shown in Figure 7.
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Identified costs 
System
stewardship 
Pilot design and program management  
Continued strengthening of
management systems 
Revenue
collection
Not applicable 
Risk pooling Not applicable 
Enablers 
Overall ICT system 
Computers and Internet for network hospitals 
Aarogya Mithras and other employees 
Publicity design 
Purchasing Aarogyasri Trust employees 
Recurring 
costs
One-time 
investments 
Total cost of system transition by type 
5.1 percent of public health 
expenditure over 2007-2009 
1 Health insurance coverage rate estimates differ by source and are shown as ranges where available 
°
11.9
48.4
Figure 8: The Cost of Transition in Andhra Pradesh
US$ millions, 2009-adjusted, 2007-09
System Reform and 
Management Capacity Costs 
Best estimates from leaders involved in
the design, pilot and scale-up of the
Aarogyasri Scheme show that the cost of
AP’s health system reforms between 2007
and 2009 totaled $60.7 million, or 5.1
percent of public health expenditure in
the state over that time period; this is
shown in Figure 8.63
One-time costs of $48.8 million
include pilot setup and operations in the
first year, with operations encompassing
human resources, publicity design, admin-
istration, basic information technology
such as computers and fax machines, the
purchase of computers and Internet serv-
ices for each network hospital and support
for overall sector management from the
United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development (DFID).64 65 66
Accounting for the majority of recur-
ring costs are the salaries of employees of
the Aarogyasri Trust and Aarogya
Mithras. Trust employees cost $1.8 mil-
lion per year, while Aarogya Mithras run
$2.1 million per year and other employ-
ees (e.g., the Rajiv Aarogyasri Medical
Coordinator) cost $1 million.
Administrative expenses involved in refer-
ring patients from primary health centers
to hospitals total $100,000 over the peri-
od the program has been in place. Finally,
there is a recurring information technolo-
gy cost of $1 million per year.67
process included stakeholders from across
the health system—both public and 
private—and beyond the health sector,
too (e.g., senior officials from other 
government departments, such as rural
development, were appointed to the
board of the trust). 
There were, however, a number of
developments that enabled the reform 
to proceed as rapidly as it did. First,
advances in information technology sup-
ported both enrollment and claims man-
agement from providers. The status of
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh’s capitol, as 
a technology hub meant that local talent
could be drawn from to provide custom-
made, integrated solutions for the entire
system. Second, the government exploited
private sector capabilities in the third-
party administration of the system: claim
processing, risk management and pricing.
Third, rapid economic growth in Andhra
Pradesh meant a stronger fiscal position
for the state, enabling the program to 
be introduced. 
Where Next?
The state of AP has made significant
progress toward universal health coverage,
and the system will continue to evolve 
in the coming years. In the near term, 
the state will have to overcome financial
pressure at the state level. The state’s
budget deficit is increasing, at $2.2 bil-
lion in 2008-2009, up from $1.7 billion
in 2007-2008, while historically strong
economic growth in the state has slowed
since 2009.77 78 The Aarogyasri Scheme
must also address the uneven distribution
of health camps, which require some 
families to travel more than 400 miles 
to a hospital.79
Leaders within the Aarogyasri Scheme
describe potential future reforms, includ-
ing decreasing the role of Star Health,
increasing the depth of the benefits pack-
age and further tightening the payment
mechanism to decrease costs. They are
also considering expanding enrollment to
government employees, formal sector
workers and people whose government-
issued pink ID cards entitle them to sub-
sidized prices for staples.80 81
Impact of the Health System Reforms
n Financing. AP’s state health budget has
increased more than 100 percent since
2005-2006. This increase can be attrib-
uted partially to growth in spending on
tertiary care and social protection seen
in Figure 9.68
n Breadth and depth of coverage. The
breadth of health coverage in Andhra
Pradesh has increased dramatically
since the introduction and scale-up of
the Aarogyasri Scheme, growing from
10 to15 percent in 2006 to approxi-
mately 85 percent today; this can be
seen in Figure 10.69- 73 During this time,
the definition of being below the
poverty line was changed to include
more families, increasing from 25,000
to 60,000 rupees (US$540 to $1,300)
per year.74 Coverage is shallow, but pro-
vides some financial protection to fam-
ilies living below the poverty line. The
program has recorded an increase in
the utilization of the secondary and
tertiary medical services it covers. 
For example, between the initiation 
of the program in 2007 and March
2009, 250,000 procedures had been
performed, with 287,000 procedures 
performed between March 2009 and 
2010 alone.75
Factors Contributing to 
Successful Reform
The driving force behind the reform was
the Chief Minister, Dr. Y.S. Rajasekhara
Reddy, a physician by training who, in his
position, continued to see and treat
patients. His tour of the state showed that
poor health and inability to pay for treat-
ment were among the biggest problems
facing the population. Health system
leaders in Andhra Pradesh repeatedly cite
his vision as being critical to the system’s
success. The National Rural Health
Mission, started in 2005, also showed
that large-scale programs were possible.76
Furthermore, the health system reform
was placed within a broader narrative 
of progressive social reform implemented
by the state government. The design
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The breadth of health 
coverage in Andhra Pradesh 
has increased dramatically…
growing from 10 to 15 percent
in 2006 to approximately 
85 percent today.
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1 Health insurance coverage rate estimates differ by source and are shown as ranges where available 
°
Constant US$, millions1
Year
08-09 07-08 06-07 05-06 04-05 03-04 02-03 
1 Actual values approximate
 
2 Best estimate
Year
Other
Drugs
Medical/dental education 
Tertiary care
Secondary care
Social protection programs
Family welfare 
Disease control
Primary care (AYUSH) 
Primary care (allopathic)
Administration 
08-09
2
07-08 06-07 05-06 04-05 
Distribution expenditure of the Department of Health,
Medical, and Family Welfare   
Constant US$, millions
Expenditure of the Department of Health,
Medical, and Family Welfare   
Figure 9: Financial Impact of Reforms in Andhra Pradesh
Health insurance coverage rate in Andhra Pradesh 
Percent
India
China
Mexico
Brazil
Russia
Health insurance coverage rate in peer countries 
Percent, latest available over 2005-07 
20162006
15
10
6
24
79
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Figure 10: Impact on Coverage
Source: Andhra Pradesh Health Sector Reforms: A Narrative Case Study. ACCESS Health Initiative; The Rockefeller Foundation—Initiative on the Role
of the Private Sector in Health Systems in Developing Countries, 2009; McKinsey analysis
Source: aarogyasri.org; AP Department of Health, Family, and Medical Welfare; International Labour Organization, Social health protection: an ILO
strategy toward universal access to health care, Social Security Department, August 2007; Andhra Pradesh Health Sector Reforms: A Narrative Case
Study; ACCESS Health Initiative; The Rockefeller Foundation—Initiative on the Role of the Private Sector in Health Systems in Developing Countries, 2009
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Ghana’s ambitions for universal health
coverage are constrained by the realities of
available resources. Human resources for
health are lower than the average in Sub-
Saharan Africa83, and less than half of
what is recommended by the World
Health Organization (WHO). Ghana has
11 health professionals per 10,000 peo-
ple, while 23 is the minimum recom-
mended for adequate capacity to meet
health-related Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).84
The human capital constraints are mir-
rored by limited hospital bed capacity:
Ghana has only nine hospital beds per
10,000 people.85 The availability of medi-
cines in Ghana is poor, and their cost is
high. Between 2001 and 2007, common
generic medicines were available only 17.9
percent of the time in the public sector
and 44.6 percent of the time in the private
sector. When available, medicines in
Ghana cost 240 percent of benchmark
prices in the public sector, and 380 percent
of the benchmark in the private sector.86
Total health expenditure accounted for
6 percent of Ghana’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in 2007.87 Out-of-pocket
spending accounted for about 50 percent
of spending, and government for about 36
percent. Out-of-pocket spending as a pro-
portion of total spending on health was
higher than that of Ghana’s peers. This
can be seen more clearly in Figure 11.88
Ghana’s Pre-reform Health System 
Ghana’s journey toward universal health
coverage has lasted more than ten years
and has taken Ghana from covering less
than 1 percent of its population in 1999
(which it did through mutual health
organization funds) to covering between
45 percent and 70 percent in 2009
(through a formalized system of district-
level health insurance programs).89 90 91 92
Prior to the community health insur-
ance reforms in 2004, 1 percent of
Ghana’s population had some form of
health insurance. Most citizens made out-
of-pocket payments for medical services.
For most patients, this meant avoiding
care unless it was absolutely necessary,
and many were excluded altogether.
Context
Ghana is a low-income country in West
Africa with a population of approximately
24 million. Life expectancy is 59 years for
men and 61 years for women, and the
population is evenly split between rural
and urban areas. Ghana’s economy has
been growing rapidly, and over the past
12 years, GDP has more than tripled,
from $5 billion to $16 billion. The pover-
ty rate has tumbled, too, from more than
50 percent in the 1990s to 28.5 percent
in 2006.82
Case Study
HEALTH INSURANCE
REFORMS IN GHANA
2004–2009
Summary: In 2003, Ghana passed the
National Health Insurance Act, which
established a system of community health
insurance. Risk is pooled at a district level
(there are 138 districts nationwide), with
beneficiaries making annual contributions
which vary by income. The benefits pack-
age is comprehensive considering the con-
text of Ghana, covering all primary and
secondary care, with a small number of
specific exclusions. The main source of
financing, however, is a 2.5 percent value-
added tax that is dedicated to subsidizing
the community insurance system. 
The system was implemented in 2004;
today, somewhere between 45 percent
and 70 percent of the population is
enrolled. Enrollment rates of the wealthi-
est quintile are roughly double those of
the poorest. The jury is still out on how
or whether Ghana will enroll its poorest
citizens. Research indicates that Ghana
spent $115.6 million on system reform
and management capacity over the peri-
od from 2004 to 2009. This number is
equivalent to 6.6 percent of public health
expenditures, and 2.4 percent of total
health expenditures.
Ghana’s journey toward 
universal health coverage has…
taken Ghana from covering 
less than 1 percent of its popu-
lation…to covering between 
45 percent and 70 percent…
Financing was mixed, coming from
public, private and voluntary sources. The
ministry of health owned and operated
public providers, while mutual health
organizations paid public and private
providers on a fee-for-service basis. The
Christian Health Association of Ghana
initially supplied most of the provision for
the members of the mutual health organi-
zations. Then, over time, the provider net-
work expanded to include public facilities
and other private providers.100 101
Reform Design and 
Implementation Process
Throughout the 1990s, there was a rising
tide of discontent with the health system
and its high user fees. The public and the
media considered the system little more
than “cash and carry.”102 103 National and
local media increasingly carried stories of
those denied access to care.104
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Government programs provided care for
children under five, adults over 70, expec-
tant mothers and the disabled.93 94 95
Beginning in the mid-1990s, volun-
tary, community-led mutual health
organizations began to form at a local
level, pooling catastrophic risk for their
members. By 2003, more than 250 of
these local initiatives had been estab-
lished,96on average covering 1,000 people
each. Most mutual health organizations
were funded by international donors or
by premiums collected from their mem-
bers, with little formal contribution from
the government.97 98 99
1 Health insurance coverage rate estimates differ by source and are shown as ranges where available 
°
Source of financing by country 
Percent, 2007
Tanzania 31%
4%
Senegal 32%
8%
1%
Uganda 39% 0%
Kenya 41% 4%
Ghana
50% 4%
Nigeria 64%
5%
2%
Government 
Other private 
Insurance
Out of pocket 
1,382
747
830
5,322
624
Total health spending 
US$ millions, 2007
911
28%
36%
37% 24%
58%
59%6%
7%
10%
48%
Figure 11: Ghana’s Health Expenditure Compared to its Peers
[Before reforms] financing
was mixed, coming from 
public, private and voluntary
sources.
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constraints: first, that the benefits package
should be comprehensive and cover all
but a small list of specific exclusions (e.g.,
cosmetic surgery); second, that payers and
providers should be split, and that the
new system’s form should mirror the
mutual health organizations that were
perceived to be both popular and success-
ful; and third, that additional financing
would need to be directed toward the
health sector.108
In the summer of 2003, the govern-
ment introduced a bill to the final parlia-
mentary session of the year, and the
National Health Insurance Act was passed.
The act put the design of the technical
committee on a statutory footing.109 110
In 2004, Ghana launched its commu-
nity health insurance scheme under the
National Health Insurance Authority. 
The reform timeline is shown in 
Figure 12.
In the run-up to the national elections
of 2000, health system reform exploded
into the political debate. A journalist wit-
nessed a student injured in a car crash,
and wrote about how he was denied care
at a public hospital for lack of means.105
Health system reform promptly became
“issue one” in the elections, with the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) excoriating the gov-
ernment for the system’s failures. NPP
leader John Kufuor was sworn into office
as president on January 7, 2001 with a
firm mandate to abolish the “cash and
carry” health system.106 107
In 2001, under the direction of
President Kufuor, Ghana’s Ministry of
Health convened a technical committee
to oversee the design of the new health
system, with participants from across the
health sector and political representatives.
At a high level, key features of the system
had been predetermined by political 
80 percent of ill-
health and early
deaths attributed to
“infectious disease,
pregnancy, and
child-related
problems and
accidents”
(President Kuofor)
MoH task team formed to
develop the National health
insurance system for Ghana
Plans to network all
DHMIS service
providers to NHIA to
improve accountability
for central funding
received and to
improve premium
collection rates
14.5 million people
enrolled in NHIS
(70 percent1)
Kufuor/NPP wins election having run on a
platform of abolishing the “cash and carry
system” of health delivery
MoH allocates
$2.15 million to
support extension
of existing district
insurance schemes
National Health
Insurance Authority
schemes launched
8 million people
enrolled in NHIS
(38 percent)
NHIA proposes changes to
the Ghanaian Cabinet to
eliminate district autonomy
Feb 2003
2004
Dec 2006
2008National Health Insurance
Act creates sustainable
insurance fund for each
district drawing heavily from
a 2.5 percent addition to VAT
Mar 2001
1 NHIS reports 70 percent, but other sources and interviewees suggest closer to 45-60 percent
World Bank loans $15 million to the
National Health Insurance Council
to strengthen the financial and
operational management of the NHIS
July 2007
1999
Three mutual
health
organizations
exist
2000
Aug 2003
2009
258 mutual health
organizations exist
Figure 12: Ghana’s Health Reform Timeline
In the summer of 2003, 
the government introduced a
bill to the final parliamentary
session of the year, and the
National Health Insurance 
Act was passed.
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Key Features of Reformed System
n Stewardship. Under the new system,
stewardship functions are split between
the Ministry of Health (responsible for
setting health sector policy, coordinat-
ing donor contributions, and public
health functions) and the National
Health Insurance Council (responsible
for monitoring all health insurance
programs).111 112
n Payer structure. Health coverage was
made mandatory, with three payers
through which citizens could obtain
coverage: District Wide Mutual Health
Insurance Schemes (DWMHIS);
Private Commercial Health Insurance
Schemes (PCHIS); and Private Mutual
Health Insurance Schemes.113 114
The National Health Insurance
Authority administers the largest of the
three payers, the District Wide Mutual
Health Insurance Scheme. This is
structured into ten regional offices,
which oversee 138 district programs
across 145 districts.115 Each district
scheme is registered as a private com-
pany, covers a specific geography and is
the level at which risk is pooled.116 117
n Enrollment and benefits package. Formal
sector workers are enrolled into the
District Wide Mutual Health
Insurance Scheme automatically, for
which 2.5 percent of their salary is
deducted through payroll taxes.
Informal sector workers are enrolled
after they pay premiums to their local
health insurance committees, with pre-
miums adjusted according to income.
Members of the health insurance com-
mittees travel house to house to enroll
families and describe payment options. 
Each adult resident is identified
through his or her residential address
and assigned a receipt booklet with 12
tokens. The resident uses these tokens
to pay the annual insurance premiums
in 12 installments at the program’s
offices or at local banks or pharma-
cies.118 119 Health insurance identifica-
tion cards are issued six months after
the first premium payment is
received.120 121 People who are indigent
or more than 70 years old—along with
children under age 18 who have both
parents enrolled—are exempt from
paying premiums.122
n Reimbursement mechanism. Providers
deliver care to patients and are reim-
bursed on an activity basis through the
Ghana-DRG system. The current
claims system is a manual one in which
physicians note claims on a spreadsheet
and present the spreadsheet to the local
program. The program determines
which claims are valid, and reimburses
the physician for as much money as
the district program can afford. The
remaining balance must be taken to
the national level to be reimbursed.
This process is lengthy and inefficient.
Currently, physicians experience an
average of three to six months of delay
in reimbursement.123 124 This payment
mechanism is currently under review.125
n Provision. Provision in Ghana is moni-
tored by the Ghana Health Service and
Ghana Health Service Council.126 127
Patients attend community health
planning services and head to sub-dis-
trict health centers for their primary
care. Referrals are required to visit a
district hospital, tertiary center or pub-
lic or private teaching hospital for sec-
ondary or tertiary care. The Christian
Health Association of Ghana provides
42 percent of total health care services,
and the private sector accounts for 
35 percent.128
People who are indigent 
or more than 70 years old—
along with children under 
age 18 who have both parents
enrolled —are exempt from
paying premiums.
n Financing. The District Wide Mutual
Health Insurance Scheme receives
funding from multiple financing levers
based on the demographics of those it
covers. This is illustrated in Figure 13.
A 2.5 percent value-added tax (VAT)
health insurance levy and contributions
from the Social Security and National
Trust (2.5 percent payroll tax for for-
mal sector workers) are disbursed from
the Ministry of Financing and
Economic Planning to the National
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).129 130 131
The NHIF also receives income from
the interest on the fund itself and from
allocations directly from the Ghanaian
Parliament. At the district level, the
programs receive premiums from infor-
mal sector workers and subsidies from
the NHIF.132
System reform and management
capacity costs
Best estimates from interviews and pri-
mary sources reveal that the cost of
Ghana’s health system reforms between
2004 and 2009 was $115.6 million,
accounting for 6.6 percent of public
health expenditure and 2.4 percent of
total health expenditure over that peri-
od,133 134 as indicated in Figure 14.
System stewardship totaled $17.6 mil-
lion, and included program management,
stakeholder management, operational
expenses for the National Health
Insurance Authority (NHIA), consultants
and technical support for the District
Wide Mutual Health Insurance Scheme
(DWMHIS), and a World Bank loan to
the National Health Insurance Fund
(NHIF) for strengthening the financial
and operational management of the
fund.135 Purchasing and revenue collection
cost $67.3 million and included register-
ing district-level programs and adminis-
trative support.136
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Expenditures
Administration and general 
expenses of NHIA 
Payment of claims to health 
care providers 
Income
Administration and logistical 
support to DMHIS 
Health insurance levy  
(2.5 percent of VAT) 
Social Security and 
National Trust contributions  
(2.5 percent of payroll from 
formal sector) 
Interest on fund 
Other income (e.g., funds 
allocated from Ghanaian 
Parliament) 
Premium and registration fees 
 
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)  
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  
District Mutual Health 
Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) 
Subsidies Reinsurance
 
41.6
149.5
14.6
0.03
33.9
Figure 13: Financial Flows in the Ghanaian Health System 
US$ millions, 2009
Finally, $30.7 million was spent by
the government on identification cards,
regional offices, DWMHIS offices, rent
for NHIA headquarters and the setup 
and operations of the information tech-
nology program.137
Impact of Reforms
Ghana’s health sector has been markedly
transformed since the 2004 reforms. 
n Health coverage. Estimates vary for the
share of the population with health
coverage. As shown in Figure 15, the
National Health Insurance Scheme
(NHIS) assessment is that 70 percent
of the population is enrolled.138 Other
sources peg that number as falling
between 45 percent and 61 percent of
the population.139 140 141 142 The number
of health insurance identification card
holders was 45 percent in 2008.143
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Identified costs Example components Total cost over 2004-2009
US$ millions, 2009-adjusted 
System stewardship 
Consultants and design of DWMHIS 
Stakeholder management 
Program management 
NHIA operational expenses
17.6
Enablers 
Identification cards 
ICT platform setup and operations 
Rent for NHIA and DWMHIS offices 
NHIA headquarters/regional offices 
30.7
Purchasing, revenue collection
and risk pooling 
Creation of regional schemes 
Registration of beneficiaries
Administrative support 
67.3
TOTAL: 115.6 
6.6 percent of public health expenditure  
2.4 percent of total health expenditure
Figure 14: Cost of Health System Reform and Management Capacity in Ghana
Health insurance coverage rate in Ghana 
Percent
Senegal 
Tanzania 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Kenya 
Namibia 
Health insurance coverage rate in select 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Percent, latest available over 2005-07 
2009
701
20062003
Figure 15: Impact on Coverage
1 National Health Insurance Scheme estimates coverage at 70 percent of the population, but interviewees and other sources suggest coverage 
is between 45-60 percent 
Source: International Labour Organization, Social health protection: an ILO strategy towards universal access to health care, Social Security
Department, August 2007; Results for Development, Joint Learning Workshop: Moving Toward Universal Health Coverage, Country Case Studies,
2010; Ghana Ministry of Health, Independent Review, Health Sector Programme of Work, April 2009; National Health Insurance Scheme, 
“The road to Ghana’s Healthcare Financing,” 2010; Interviews
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n Utilization. Service utilization has in-
creased in line with the uptick of identi-
fication card holders. Births assisted by
a medical professional have increased to
57 percent of births in 2008, up from
47 percent in 2003, and under-five
mortality has dropped from 111 out of
every 1,000 live births to 80 out of that
figure over the same period of time.144
n Health sector financing. Total expenditure
on health has remained fairly constant
as a share of GDP (fluctuating between
6 percent and 7 percent) over the past
decade.145 This has been in the context
of a rapidly expanding economy. As
can be seen in Figure 16, Ghana’s
compounded annual growth rate over
the past decade has been 16 percent.146
It is noteworthy that the 2.5 percent
VAT hypothecated to the health system
does not appear to have been reflected
in total health expenditure.147 148 The
reasons for this are unclear. On a per
capita basis, total health expenditure
has increased from $19 in 2002 to $39
in 2007. Meanwhile, government
spending has doubled, growing from
$7 per person in 2002 to $14 person
in 2007.149
Total health expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
Percent
Ghana GDP  
Constant US$, billion
20072006200420022000
+16% per annum 
0504 080302012000 0706
Figure 16: Total Health Expenditure and GDP in Ghana
n Sources of financing. The composition of
Ghana’s total health expenditure has
changed significantly over the course of
reform, with a significant decline in
out-of-pocket expenditures. In 2004,
just before the establishment of the
National Health Insurance Authority,
more than 50 percent of Ghana’s total
health expenditure was out of pocket.
That percentage had dropped to less
than 40 percent by 2007.150 
Where Next?
Ghana’s health system faces several chal-
lenges. First, inequality in access to cover-
age and health services remains a formida-
ble obstacle to universal health coverage.
Sixty-four percent of the wealthiest quin-
tile is enrolled in the program, compared
to 29 percent of the poorest quintile.151 152
Questions remain about how or whether
more poor people will be enrolled. 
A second challenge is an inadequate
information technology system, which
has the dual consequence of delaying
claims reimbursement and enabling cor-
ruption within the system. The manual
claims system causes prolonged delays in
reimbursement,153 154 deterring physicians
from providing the highest quality care.
Further, physicians can choose the most
expensive procedure and diagnosis-related
group (DRG) for reimbursement regard-
less of actual diagnosis, and district-level
programs have little accountability for
how the funds received are spent.155 156
Several issues are currently under debate
that will determine Ghana’s path forward.
First, the government is considering consol-
idating the management of district-level
programs into a national-level structure to
foster higher transparency and greater
accountability.157 Second, the current World
Bank project on financial and operating
management within the fund has recently
completed a technology needs assessment,
the results of which will inform how a new
IT system might be built.158 Third, a poten-
tial move away from the Ghana-DRG sys-
tem toward one of capitation is being con-
sidered, leaving economic management to
individual health facilities to curb corrup-
tion and limit system-wide financial risk.
Fourth, discussion is underway to exempt
children under 18 years old from premi-
ums payment even if both parents are not
enrolled. Finally, authorities are also recon-
sidering the financial sustainability of the
system, as it relies on a relatively fixed VAT
for funding even as enrollment increases
and the benefits packages get deeper.159 160
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Case Study
HEALTH SYSTEM 
REFORMS IN CHILE
1992–2008
In 1952, Chile created its Ministry of
Health, and through a network of public
providers declared there would be formal
health coverage for all. By 1975, the sys-
tem had, in essence, achieved universality.
Between 1979 and 1991, the public payer
Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA)
and a network of primary care providers
were created. Since 1992, three waves of
reform have served to deepen the benefits
package available to Chileans. 
The first wave, from 1992 to 1999,
saw the restructuring and strengthening of
the public payer, FONASA, to enhance its
purchasing functions. This period also saw
the creation of specific catastrophic cover-
age products for selected conditions in the
public and private sectors. During the sec-
ond wave, Chile’s Health Reform
Commission developed proposals to
strengthen the system. The third wave of
reform created explicit, enforceable guar-
antees on access and quality for 56 condi-
tions that were defined as high priority.
The system reform and management
capacity costs of these reforms were
$492.9 million, or 0.9 percent of public
health expenditure and 0.6 percent of
total health expenditure.
Chile’s journey toward 
universal health coverage has
spanned six decades and has
occurred in several steps. Context
Chile is a middle-income country in
South America with a population of 16.6
million.161 Life expectancy is 74 years for
men and 81 years for women, and 88
percent of the population lives in urban
areas.162 Chile’s economy has grown rapid-
ly over the past 25 years. Gross domestic
product (GDP) has increased nearly ten-
fold from $17 billion in 1985 to $169
billion in 2008. 163 The percent of the
population living on less than $1 a day
has dropped from 6.2 percent in 1990 to
1 percent in 2000.164
Chile has undergone an epidemiologi-
cal transition and now has a disease bur-
den profile dominated by non-communi-
cable disease, similar to most developed
countries.165 166 Chile’s performance on
infant, child and maternal mortality indi-
cators is dramatically better than that of
its peers.167
As seen in Figure 17, total health
expenditure was $9.1 billion (5.6 percent
of GDP) in 2007. Of this, 54 percent was
spent by the government, 22 percent was
associated with insurance, and 25 percent
was from patients’ out-of-pocket spend-
ing, putting Chile in line with other
South American countries and with its
global peers with respect to sources of
health financing.168 Overseas development
assistance for health was $4.9 million in
2007, the majority of which went toward
HIV/AIDS programs.169
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Figure 17: Chile’s Health Financing Compared to Peers
* Average 2007 exchange rate from National Health Accounts
1 Peer countries selected based on similarities in GDP per capita
Source: WHO National Health Accounts
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In the years before 1979 the public sec-
tor dominated provision, performing 90
percent of hospital services and more than
85 percent of outpatient treatments. The
upper class largely paid out of pocket for
private medical services, but the majority
of blue-collar workers and poor residents
had to visit public facilities where services
were often slow except for those that
addressed life-threatening conditions.177
Chile’s Health System from 
1952 to 1978 
Chile’s road to universal health coverage
began in 1924 with the creation of social
security for formal sector workers.174 In
1952, the National Health Service
(Servicio Nacional de Salud or SNS) was
established to provide medical services
and drugs free of charge to blue-collar
workers and indigent people, who com-
prised about 60 percent of the popula-
tion. In 1969, the National Medical
Service for Employees (Servicio Médico
para Empleados or SERMENA) was cre-
ated for white-collar workers, who
accounted for about 25 percent of the
population. These institutions were fund-
ed via tax revenues, payroll contributions
and out-of-pocket payments. An addi-
tional 5 percent of the population was
covered by military health services and 10
percent by the private medical sector.175 176
Chile’s Journey to Universal 
Health Coverage
Chile’s journey toward universal health
coverage has spanned six decades and has
occurred in several steps. Each step has
broadened coverage to a greater portion
of the population and deepened the bene-
fits package, taking Chile from minimal
coverage in 1950 (achieved through social
security funds) to 95 to 100 percent cov-
erage in 2008 (achieved through a regu-
lated system of public and private payers
guaranteeing quality services). 
This case study briefly describes the
health system reforms between 1952 and
1991 and examines the period from 
1992 to 2008 in depth. During this time,
the health financing system was reformed
and the benefits package was deepened. 
The reform timeline is shown in 
Figure 18.170 171 172 173
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Figure 18: Timeline of Health System Reform in Chile
Source: “How health coverage is provided in Chile,” Kevin Hagen; “The Chilean Health System: 20 Years of Reform,” Annick Manuel, Salud Publica
de Mexico; expert interviews; “Chile’s Neoliberal Health Reform: An Assessment and a Critique,” Jean-Pierre Unger, PLoS Medicine; “The Politics of
the AUGE Health Reform in Chile,” Bitran y Asociados; May 2008; interviews
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n Enrollment. All patients were identified
using Chile’s preexisting tax identifica-
tion system. Patients could choose
between insurance types (though for
economic reasons, low-income and
high-risk populations were compelled
to choose FONASA) and were enrolled
into either insurance option through a
mandatory 7 percent payroll tax.182 183
Patients enrolled in ISAPREs could
choose to pay an additional premium
to upgrade the baseline benefits pack-
age. Indigent people were exempt from
all payments.184
n Reimbursement mechanism. Public
providers were paid on a global budget
basis by FONASA and the Ministry of
Health. FONASA and ISAPREs pur-
chased services from private providers
through a fee-for-service system.185 186
n Provision. Provision, like the payer
mechanism, was divided between the
public and private sectors. In 1979, the
National Health Service and SERME-
NA were combined into one entity, the
Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud
(SNSS). Secondary and tertiary health
service delivery was decentralized into
26 regional health departments (the
number of regional health services has
since expanded to 28).187 In 1981, pri-
mary care was decentralized from the
SNSS to the country’s 341 municipali-
ties (now 353), and these were required
to operate according to the direction 
of the ministry of health. The SNSS
provided technical assistance to the
municipalities. Referral from primary
care was required to visit a SNSS hos-
pital. Private provision was available at
primary, secondary and tertiary levels
of care.188 189
The major building blocks of the
health system described above still exist
today, but beginning in 1992, significant
reforms were undertaken to deepen the
services available to Chileans and to
ensure sustainable financing. 
Chile’s Health System from 
1979 to 1991
Chile’s military dictatorship in the 1980s
brought a period of significant change to
the country’s health system, with a strong
ideological focus on expanding the role 
of the private sector. During this period,
expenditure per member at FONASA,
the public sector payer for people who
were less well off, remained relatively
flat—a development that some observers
regarded as a deliberate attempt to run
down public institutions for ideological
reasons.178
n Payer structure. The payer system relied
on the public and private sectors. In
1979, the public payer Fondo Nacional
de Salud (FONASA ) was created to
cover the lower-income quintiles and
retirees. FONASA had accounting
functions, but was not responsible for
setting prices or signing contracts with
providers. These functions remained
within the Ministry of Health.
In 1981, legislation was passed to
legalize and define the status of the
existing private payers, Instituciones 
de Salud Previsionales (ISAPREs ).
ISAPREs provided coverage to the
middle- and upper-income quintiles.179
n Stewardship. The Ministry of Health
was responsible for health-sector policy,
administering the national payer and
coordinating the interaction of the
institutions within the health sector.
The ministry functioned as the pur-
chaser within the public system, defin-
ing service requirements and setting
prices.180 With respect to public provi-
sion, the ministry supervised, moni-
tored and evaluated the health pro-
grams and allocated the budget. 
In 1990, the government created the
superintendency of ISAPREs to regu-
late coverage across the private sector
and to determine which benefits could
be excluded from coverage (and for
how long).181
Health System Reforms from 
1992 to 2008
The health system reforms in Chile
between 1992 and 2008 occurred in three
waves, all serving to deepen the benefits
package. The first wave (1992 to 1999)
saw the restructuring of the public payer,
FONASA, to enhance its purchasing
function. This period also saw the cre-
ation of specific catastrophic coverage
products for select conditions. The sec-
ond wave (2000 to 2004) was a planning
period marked by the Health Reform
Commission, which developed proposals
to strengthen the system. The third wave
(2005 to 2008) created explicit, legally
binding guarantees on access and quality
for 56 high-priority health conditions.
First Wave of Reform (1992 to
1999): Restructuring FONASA and
Creating Catastrophic Coverage
Three primary sparks ignited the begin-
ning of health sector reform in Chile in
the early 1990s. First, the return to
democracy created a renewed sense of
civic obligation, with citizens ready to
restore public institutions.190 Secondly, a
number of persistent problems, including
the poor quality of public sector health
facilities, an inadequate availability of
physicians, and low public-sector wages
galvanized public support for reform.191 In
addition, a significant absence of perform-
ance transparency (e.g., problems pegging
costs or quality) in the private sector
caused concern to ISAPREs beneficiaries
and those using private medical services. 
Five activities were required to reform
the health financing system and to devel-
op the necessary functions within
FONASA.192
n Restructuring FONASA to include
specific collection, enrollment, pur-
chasing, risk management and moni-
toring functions (begun in 1994)
n Decentralizing some parts of FONASA
into five geographic areas (done from
1997 onwards)
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Health system reforms in the 1990s
faced several challenges. As is normal in
any reorganization, there were tensions.
Tensions existed between the ministry of
health and FONASA over the reassign-
ment of purchasing functions to the lat-
ter. Second, some hospitals were chal-
lenged by the stringent, DRG-like pay-
ment system that imposed greater trans-
parency and performance accountability
on them.201
Second Wave of Reform 
(2000 to 2004): Planning 
for the Future
An inter-ministerial Health Reform
Commission mandated by President Lagos
was charged with determining the next
steps for health system reform in Chile.
The commission was led by Dr. Herman
Sandoval and included representatives
from the Medical Doctors Professional
Association, health workers unions, 
private health providers, the Party for
Democracy and the Socialist Party.202 203
The commission concluded that the
three primary challenges it identified (an
aging population, the cost escalation of
health services and socioeconomic
inequalities in health) could only be
solved by a legislated, explicit guarantee
to basic services across the public and pri-
vate sectors.204 This was a formalization
and expansion of the catastrophic cover-
age instituted by FONASA and ISAPREs
in 1998 and 1999.205
In addition, a National Health Poll
(called the Encuesta Nacional de Calidad
de Vida y Salud) was conducted to codify
the major health problems facing the
nation and to validate the conditions 
chosen for quality guarantees in the
future.206The Ministry of Health was
divided into two undersecretaries: the
Undersecretary of Public Health and the
Undersecretary of Health Networks.207 208
n Upgrading the IT system (begun 
in 1994)
n Modifying the legal framework to
reflect FONASA’s new responsibilities
(started in 1994)193
n Developing specific insurance plans to
assure fast access to quality catastrophic
services (done from 1998 onwards)194
The reforms were designed by officials
at the ministry of health and FONASA,
who were supported in these tasks by the
World Bank. These were recognized as
the objectives in a World Bank loan to
Chile that covered the period 1992 to
1999.195 196
The main focus of the reform period
was the redistribution of purchasing func-
tions from the ministry of health to
FONASA, and the strengthening of capa-
bilities at FONASA to accomplish its new
role as a proactive payer for services. These
changes were codified into an updated
legal framework for FONASA.197 198
In 1994, FONASA issued a request for
proposals for the creation of a new system
to cover collection, enrollment, monitor-
ing and purchasing. The successful bidder
began constructing the new system in
January 1995, working with a cross-func-
tional team of experts from the private
sector and from FONASA. This team
allowed the end users of the system to
participate in the design.199
In 1998, FONASA began to develop
specific plans to cover catastrophic acci-
dents or illness (previously, all catastroph-
ic coverage was achieved through public
provision with no performance pressure).
FONASA had the ambition to move to
payment systems of the diagnosis-related
group (DRG) type, and began by piloting
a program in cardiac surgery. A presti-
gious academic clinician was enlisted 
to prepare the clinical protocols. Once
agreement on these standards had been
reached, FONASA began to set its service
prices and billing procedures. Over time,
this “Payment Associated with Diagnosis”
(PAD) system has been extended to many
more specialties.200
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Figure 19: Reformed Chilean Health System Structure
Source: The Chilean Health System: 20 years of reforms, Annick Manuel, Salud Publica de México; Country health profile Chile, PAHO; Chile’s
Neoliberal Health Reform: An Assessment and a Critique, Jean-Pierre Unger, PLoS Medicine; Health care reform in Chile, Gabriel Bastias, CMAJ; Chile:
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Third Wave of Reform 
(2005 to 2008): Deepening 
the Benefits Package
There were two sparks for reform in Chile
leading up to 2005. First, the reforms of
the 1990s, including the establishment of
catastrophic coverage, had proven that
major health system reform was possible.
Second, health reform had become a polit-
ical issue with public commitment from
the president and the public. President
Lagos assumed personal responsibility for
change, stating “One of the main tasks of
my administration will be to carry out a
deep health care reform, focused on the
rights and guarantees of the people and a
solidarity-based financial system.” 209 210
The Health Reform Commission work
from 2000 to 2004 suggested the need for
explicit and binding health-service guaran-
tees.211 In 2005, the Plan de Acceso
Universal con Garantias Explicitas
(AUGE) was passed, detailing clinical pro-
tocols, maximum wait times and maxi-
mum co-payments for 41 priority health
conditions.212 213 214 These conditions includ-
ed catastrophic guarantees and drug-inten-
sive conditions (e.g., diabetes, HIV/AIDS). 
Since 2005, the list of guaranteed con-
ditions has grown to 56. The 56 condi-
tions range from chronic diseases (e.g.,
mental health conditions, diabetes,
HIV/AIDS and epilepsy) to acute condi-
tions (e.g., cancer, acute myocardial
infarction and premature births).215 216 For
example, a diagnosis of hypertension
must occur within 45 days of the first
observation that blood pressure is greater
than 140/90 mmHg. Treatment must
begin within 24 hours of diagnosis, and
the patient is entitled to see a specialist
within 90 days of diagnosis. No co-pay-
ment is required.217 PAD reimbursement
is used in the public and private sectors
for all AUGE conditions.218
The main challenge associated with the
passing of the AUGE reform was how to
finance the explicit guarantees that were
common across private and public payers.
There were discussions of cross-subsidiza-
tion from ISAPREs to FONASA, but this
never came to pass.219 The law specifies
that funding will come from the tobacco
tax, customs revenues, the sale of the
state’s minority shares in public health
companies and a temporary increase 
in consumer taxes from 18 percent to 
19 percent.220 221
In 2005, the Superintendency of
ISAPREs expanded to become the
Superintendency of Health, encompassing
not only the private payers but also
FONASA.222
The reforms of the past 20 years have
resulted in the health system and financ-
ing flow Chile relies on today; this can be
seen in Figure 19.223-228
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Impact of the Health System
Reforms
The health system reforms have had sig-
nificant impact in several specific areas:
n Financing. Over the period of reforms
examined in this case study, total
health expenditure increased from 
$2.5 billion in 1992 to $10.4 billion 
in 2008, maintaining a consistent rela-
tionship with GDP except during the
financial crisis.229 230 Per capita spending
on health more than doubled from
$250 in 1995 to $547 in 2007. Out-
of-pocket expenditure as a portion of
total health spending has decreased
slightly, from 29 percent in 1995 to 
25 percent in 2007.231
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Figure 20: Financial Flows in the Chilean Health System
Source: The Chilean Health System: 20 years of reforms, Annick Manuel, Salud Publica de México; Chile: 20 años de esquemas liberales en 
protección social, UN Development Programme, 2003; The Politics of the AUGE Health Reform in Chile, Bitran y Asociados, May 2008
The mix of public and private
financing has shifted over time and
reflects changing priorities within the
health system. Between 1980 and
1992, public financing for health and
total expenditure on health as percent-
ages of GDP declined, while private
spending remained constant. Public
spending as a portion of total health
expenditure decreased from 50 percent
in 1980 to 40 percent in 1990.
Following the return of democracy,
public and total health expenditure
began to increase.232 233 Expenditure per
member in FONASA and ISAPREs
follows the same trend as seen in
Figure 20.234
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Figure 21: Health Financing in Chile
Source: Unger J-P, De Paepe P, Cantuarias GS, Herrera OA (2008) Chile’s neoliberal health reform: An assessment and a critique. PLoS Med 5(4):
e79; Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, “Reforming health insurance in Argentina and Chile,” Health Policy and Planning, 2000
The mix of public and 
private financing has shifted
over time and reflects changing
priorities within the health 
system.
n Breadth and depth of coverage. Chile has
nearly achieved universal health care
with respect to breadth of coverage.
Prior to the creation of SERMENA in
1969, social security was the main
source of coverage. By 1998, 95 to 98
percent of the population was covered
by either FONASA, ISAPREs, or the
military as seen in Figure 21.235 236 The
reforms of the past 20 years have
served to deepen the benefits package
and ensure quality services, though
challenges remain in enforcing the
AUGE guarantees. In an inspection of
public hospitals in 2009, 10 out of 16
hospitals did not meet the guarantees
for the conditions examined.237
As of November 2009, 92 percent of
Chileans thought the AUGE plan was
equal to or better than the pre-2005
health system, and 79 percent of those
who had directly benefited from the
AUGE plan were satisfied. Among the
most important variables cited as rea-
sons for this satisfaction were protec-
tion (47.1 percent), defined protocols
and quality (18.6 percent), clarity of
information (12.6 percent) and access
to treatment (12.2 percent).238
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the new financing program, and support-
ing provider-side training and IT. During
this period, the World Bank devoted
$66.1 million to these efforts as part of
the larger Health Sector Reform Program,
with funding going primarily to five
health service areas.241 242 The FONASA
administrative budget also increased sig-
nificantly during this time incrementally
by $96.4 million total over the period
(rising from $16.1 million in 1992 to
$32.8 million in 1999) above the 1990
baseline administrative spend.243 During
this period of reform, the cost of reform
as a percent of public health expenditure
varied from 0.7 percent to 1.2 percent.
In the planning period between 
2000 and 2004, the Health Reform
Commission cost $720,000 to operate
annually, for a total of $3.6 million over
the period.244 FONASA’s administrative
budget increased by $156.4 million during
this reform period.245 The cost of reform as
a percent of public health expenditure per
year during this period varied between 0.6
percent and 1.2 percent.
System Reform and Management
Capacity Costs
Best estimates reveal that the cost of
Chile’s health system reforms between
1992 and 2008 totaled $492.9 million
(2009-adjusted), or 0.9 percent of public
health expenditure and 0.6 percent of
total health expenditure over the period
as seen in Figure 23.
The system reform and management
capacity costs can be examined in each
period of reform previously described:
health financing reform (from 1992 to
1999); the planning period (between
2000 and 2004); and the AUGE reform
beginning in 2005. Across all periods,
leaders estimate that $150,000 was spent
per year on press and communications
and $600,200 was spent per year on
health economics and policy training.240
Between 1992 and 1999, the biggest
cost components stemmed from restruc-
turing the ministry of health and
FONASA, creating IT systems to support
n Health outcomes. Chile has seen a dra-
matic improvement in key health indi-
cators since the 1950s, coinciding with
its increasing wealth and its advance-
ments in health system reform as seen
in Figure 22. Infant mortality has
dropped from 136 per 1,000 live births
in 1950 to 9 per 1,000 live births in
2000, while life expectancy has
increased by 20 years since 1960.239
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Figure 22: Impact on Coverage
Note: Health insurance coverage rate estimates differ by source and are shown as ranges where available 
Source: Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, “Reforming health insurance in Argentina and Chile,” Health Policy and Planning, 2000
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Figure 23: Costs of Reform in Chile
Source: WHO National Health Accounts (http://www.who.int/nha/country/chl/en/); World Bank, “Staff Appraisal Report, Chile, Health Sector
Reform Project,” October 1992; Lenz, R. and de la Maza, M., “Financial Reform and Information Systems: The Chilean Experience of FONASA in
the 90s, Information Systems of the Public Health Insurance,” 1997; FONASA budgets 1995-2008, fonasa.cl; Superintendencia de Salud budgets
2005-2010, dipres.cl; “MIF approves $1.7 million to Chile to foster productivity and management tools in hospitals,” Dec 2005, Inter-American
Development Bank; Interviews
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Where Next?
Chile’s health system has made great
strides since its inception, but faces sever-
al challenges, including cost containment;
managing hospital autonomy; enforcing
the access and quality guarantees legislat-
ed in the AUGE reforms; and the contin-
ued implementation of the PAD system
of reimbursement.
In the third period, falling between
2005 and 2008 and marked by the
AUGE reforms, FONASA’s administra-
tive budget increased by $135.3 million
in total.246 Comparing the budget of the
Superintendency of ISAPREs to the new
Superintendency of Health shows an
incremental cost of $34 million over five
years.247 248 Finally, the Inter-American
Development Bank loaned $1.9 million
to the cause of fostering productivity and
management tools in hospitals.249 The
cost components of reform are shown in
Figure 24. The total cost of reform per
year as a percent of public health expen-
diture varied between 0.7 percent and 
0.9 percent.
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Figure 24: Chilean Health System Reform and Component Costs
US$, 2009-adjusted
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The economic crisis of 2001
brought the inadequacies of the
existing system into sharp relief. 
Case Study
DEEPENING COVERAGE
THROUGH THE HEALTH
TRANSFORMATION
PROGRAM IN TURKEY
2003–2009
Summary: In 2003, the newly-elected
government of Turkey launched the
Health Transformation Program, which
achieved sweeping aims: reforming the
fragmented system from multiple 
parallel public payers to a single payer;
increasing financing to the health sector;
and extending patients’ access to a 
deeper package of services. 
Prior to 2003, 85 percent of the 
population was covered by a series of
parallel public and private payers, with
each of these covering defined popula-
tion segments and operating its own
infrastructure, purchasing practices, and
accredited providers. By 2008 all former
public payers were consolidated into the
national payer Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu
(SGK), and all citizens were entitled to
the same benefits package. In addition
to system reforms, Turkey has invested
heavily in primary medical care for 
its population. 
Since 2000, impoverishment due to
catastrophic health expenses has been 
cut in half, and patient satisfaction has
risen from 40 percent to 67 percent.
Nevertheless, Turkey faces considerable
fiscal challenges. Cost escalation in both
the public and private sectors left SGK
with a deficit of $2.5 billion in 2008.
Interviews indicate that Turkey may
have spent $80 million to $440 million
on system reform and management
capacity from 2003 to 2009. That is the
equivalent of 0.2 percent of public
health expenditure and 0.1 percent of
total health expenditure.
Context
Turkey is a middle-income country locat-
ed at the intersection of Southeastern
Europe and Southwestern Asia. It has a
population of almost 74 million. Life
expectancy at birth is 70 years for men
and 74 years for women. The rural popu-
lation comprises 31 percent of the total
population, and 20 percent of the nation
lives below the poverty line. 
Turkey’s disease burden is split by
geography. Non-communicable diseases
dominate overall, accounting for 79 per-
cent of total deaths. Even so, communica-
ble diseases, prenatal conditions and
nutritional deficiencies present a notice-
able burden in the Eastern regions of the
country. Turkey has made sustained
progress in improving its health outcomes
over the past two decades, but the coun-
try still faces considerable challenges.
Infant mortality has improved from 67
deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 24
per 1,000 live births in 2006, though
Turkey still lags behind its peers overall
and there remains significant variability in
health outcomes among different regions
within the country.
Compared to other middle-income
countries, Turkey has good availability of
human resources for health services,
though in this respect it lags behind other
countries in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). The availability
of health workers in Turkey is below the
OECD average, with 1.6 practicing
physicians and 3 practicing nurses per
1,000 lives (the OECD averages are 3
and 10, respectively). In 2006, 83 percent
of births were attended by a skilled health
professional, compared to 100 percent in
Russia, Germany and Poland. The utiliza-
tion of available acute care beds was 65
percent in 2006, compared to 82 percent
in the UK and 77 percent in Poland.
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was the largest public insurer, covering
white- and blue-collar workers, who
made up 46 percent of the population.
Emekli-Sandigi (the Government
Retirement Fund or ES) provided cov-
erage for retired public servants, and
the Bag-Kur (occupational pension
fund) provided coverage for artisans
and the self-employed. Together, the ES
and Bag-Kur covered 38 percent of the
population. Yesilkart (the Green Card
program or YK) covered inpatient serv-
ices for families making less than a
third of minimum wage. 
n Coverage. In total, 64 percent to 85 per-
cent of the population had some form
of health insurance. However, the ben-
efits package varied considerably by
payer (e.g., Green Card services cov-
ered only catastrophic conditions). 
Total health expenditure as a percent of
GDP has increased from 4.9 percent in
2000 to 6.4 percent in 2008, and total
health expenditure in absolute terms has
nearly doubled from 36 billion Turkish
liras (about US$25.5 billion) to 61 billion
liras (US$43.2) over the same time peri-
od. This increase is in line with expecta-
tions of the correlation between GDP per
capita and total health expenditure per
capita as seen in Figure 25. Out-of-pock-
et expenditures accounted for 23 percent
of total health spending in 2007, a value
lower than that of most of Turkey’s peers
(in Poland, that number was 26 percent,
while in Mexico it was 30 percent and in
Russia it was 50 percent). Donor funding
does not play a significant role in health
financing, and consists mainly of
European Union support for reproductive
health programs.250
Key Features of Turkey’s 
Prior System
n Stewardship. The Turkish Ministry 
of Health was responsible for health
service delivery and health policy, as
well as health insurance for the poor.
The Ministry of Labor and Social
Security administered the remaining
public payers. 
n Payer structure. Prior to 2003, the system
consisted of a series of parallel payers
each with its own governance, benefits
package and purchasing standards.
Each of the four public payers covered
a different population segment and
dependents, while private payers cov-
ered the wealthy. Of the four govern-
ment schemes, the Sigortalar Kurumu
(the Social Security Association or SSK)
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Figure 25: Total Health Expenditure in Turkey
Source: School of Public Health; TURKSTAT; Health at a Glance—Turkey, 2007; McKinsey analysis
the risk of impoverishment due to cata-
strophic expenditures was more apparent.
To many, the safety net of the state was
not providing sufficient security.
Anecdotal evidence of widespread dissat-
isfaction with the health system was con-
firmed by surveys that reported more
than 60 percent of the population was
dissatisfied with problems such as limited
access for some, unequal benefits across
programs and a low quality of services. 
The elections of 2002 were decisive.
The AK Party swept into power, ushering
in Turkey’s first single-party government
since 1987. The party had stood on a
platform of fundamental democratic 
and economic reform. In the health 
sector, that was realized as the Health
Transformation Program, which was
launched in 2003. 
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Figure 26: Pre-2003 Turkish Health System
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The Health Transformation Program,
therefore, was focused on deepening
the package of services, as well as
broadening coverage to those outside
the existing system. 
n Reimbursement and payment mechanisms.
The Government Retirement Fund,
Green Card program, Bag-Kur and pri-
vate payers all relied on fee-for-service
models to purchase medical services,
albeit with unique pricing and billing
systems. The SSK funded its own hos-
pitals via direct budget transfer.
n Provision. Secondary and tertiary care
provision was dominated by the public
sector, which administered 92 percent
of all hospital beds. The ministry of
health administered 60 percent of hos-
pitals and multiple other public entities
(universities, SSK). Meanwhile, govern-
ment bodies ran their own facilities
(e.g., the postal and rail services).
Public hospitals were financed directly
by the government. Private hospitals
played a relatively small role, and were
concentrated heavily in the large cities
(such as Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir).
These hospitals were primarily financed
by patients, but the SSK and Bag-Kur
also had contracts with a targeted group
that provided specialist care. 
The major components of Turkey’s pre-
vious system are illustrated in Figure 26.
Origins of Reform
The economic crisis of 2001 brought the
inadequacies of the existing system into
sharp relief. With rising unemployment,
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Turkey’s health system had evolved
over six decades, developing parallel sys-
tems for different population segments:
from the civil service, to the army, to
blue-collar workers, to the poor. In
essence, the principal accomplishment
had been a broadening of coverage to
include around 64-85 percent of the pop-
ulation. Nevertheless, the benefits pack-
age varied considerably, with some receiv-
ing a significantly more generous package
than others. This in itself presented a
great political challenge. Some groups,
such as civil servants, feared that reform
would mean a leveling down rather than
a leveling up in their cases. The evolution
of the system is described in Figure 27.
Proposals for reform had been devel-
oped throughout the 1990s by senior
officials within the Turkish government.
By the time the AK Party was elected,
much of the technical effort had been
underway for a considerable period of
time. The final reform proposals were
changes have been required for the inte-
gration of payers, the creation of the fam-
ily medicine program, reimbursement
and claims and system financing. The
process has been a rollercoaster ride:
major legislation on health insurance was
thrown out by the constitutional court on
the grounds of its inequity, forcing the
government to return to the legislative
drawing board. The legislative process of
refining health reform continues to this
day. The key features of Turkey’s reformed
health system are outlined in Figure 28.
The Key Features of 
Reformed System
n Stewardship. The ministry of health
remains the system steward, responsible
for the overall system design, and for
arbitrating interactions between each
part of the system. Today the ministry
continues to retain a strong role in pro-
vision, managing public hospitals and
the family medicine program through its
developed by a small team of senior offi-
cials, academics and representatives from
international institutions (e.g., World
Bank), under the leadership of the newly
appointed minister of health (himself an
academic with deep knowledge of health
policy). The proposals of the Health
Transformation Program received strong
political support from the prime minister. 
Indeed, throughout the design and ini-
tial implementation process, a small group
of senior stakeholders from five govern-
ment ministries (Turkey’s prime minister’s
office and the ministries of health, finance,
the treasury and labor and social security)
met regularly to ensure cross-government
alignment in the form of a steering com-
mittee. Furthermore, success was spurred
by continuing stakeholder and political
management along with a design process
that was so broad it reached the govern-
ment, academia, trade unions, the media
and the public. 
The reform process has demanded
extensive legislative changes. Legal
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Figure 27: Turkish Health System Reform Timeline
Source: “Health Care Systems in Transition: Turkey,” European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 2002; “The Ongoing Reform in Turkish Public
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regional offices. Doctors in public
providers remain salaried government
employees of the ministry of health. The
ministry of labor and social security has
oversight of the national payer, SGK. 
n Payer structure. Turkey has created a sin-
gle-payer system. The Sosyal Güvenlik
Kurumu (Social Security Institute or
SGK) combined the SSK, Green Card
program, Bag-Kur and Government
Retirement Fund into a single entity.
According to interviews, this was the
core purpose of the reform: to create a
payer with monopoly purchasing
power to raise productivity on the
provider side and to use these efficien-
cy gains to expand health care access.251
n Enrollment and benefits package. Enroll-
ment in SGK is mandatory, except for
those who elect to buy private insurance.
All beneficiaries are entitled to the same
comprehensive benefits package. The
integration of benefits packages across
n Co-payments. Co-payments vary by type
of beneficiary and service type. For all,
outpatient exam co-payments start at
nothing for first-line health care and
increase to as much as 10 Turkish lira
(about US$6.70) for private hospital
consultations. Active contributors, pas-
sive members and their dependents
make no payment at the provider site.
The sum of their expenses (10 percent
and 20 percent of treatment tools and
outpatient medications, for passive
members and active contributors,
respectively) is deducted directly from
their salaries. After consultation, Green
Card holders must pay 10 percent of
the cost of treatment tools and outpa-
tient medications at a pharmacy. 
n Provision. Beneficiaries of SGK receive
primary care from the publicly funded
family medicine model piloted in 
2004 and gradually expanded there-
after nationwide. Patients enroll with 
a family medicine provider, often in
geographic proximity to their homes.
Family medicine physicians are given
monthly capitation payments based 
on the number of patients enrolled 
and based on their individual perform-
ances. Public health centers and posts
supplement this system. There are 
not a sufficient number of family med-
icine physicians to cover all patients, 
so referrals from primary care to 
secondary and tertiary care are no
longer required. 
Most inpatient care is still provided
by public hospitals, though the number
of private hospital beds has increased,
climbing by 15 percent every year since
2004. The Health Transformation Pro-
gram proposed integration of most
public hospitals, allowing government
entities and payers to release their pro-
vision and to facilitate hospital autono-
my. Several smaller reforms have taken
effect while the integration plan runs 
its course. Examples of reform include
granting hospitals greater flexibility over
funding and investment decisions 
and establishing a payment system for
physicians that is partially based on 
performance. 
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population segments occurred in a step-
wise fashion, with the first goal being to
deepen all packages to the level of the
Government Retirement Fund (which
had the deepest package pre-reform),
and the second goal being to add addi-
tional services to this deepened package. 
n Reimbursement and payments. A newly cre-
ated Reimbursement Commission is
responsible for setting prices and mod-
ulating the benefits package. Initially,
few changes were made to the old, frag-
mented fee-for-service model. In 2003,
a system of performance-based supple-
mentary payment was piloted in some
ministry of health hospitals; in 2004,
this system was expanded nationwide.
In 2007, the SGK created a bundled
price for outpatient and inpatient serv-
ices. Finally, a system of diagnosis-relat-
ed groups (DRGs) modeled on those in
Australia, was piloted. Implementation
of DRGS is proceeding today in public
and private hospitals. 
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n Enablers. Turkey has developed an inte-
grated information technology (IT) sys-
tem and electronic identification cards
to replace the unique systems of each of
the pre-reform payers. The Medula sys-
tem for integrated claims processing
and utilization tracking was introduced
in 2007. In February 2010, the govern-
ment announced the planned introduc-
tion of an updated system that may be
better able to provide integrated, real-
time, self-serviced information. Smart
Cards will replace existing identification
cards and drivers’ licenses, and will
carry biometric data about the holder.
Interviewees highlighted that the IT
system had been an important way for
the SGK and its predecessors to estab-
lish leverage over providers. What was
initially described as an invoicing sys-
tem was gradually expanded to include
performance metrics. 
n Financing. The Turkish health system is
principally funded through payroll tax-
ation, with a small contribution from
co-payments as can be seen in Figure
29. Private payers collect premiums
from their members. For SGK, contri-
butions are set at 12.5 percent of tax-
able income, 7.5 percent of which
comes from employers and 5 percent
from beneficiaries. The government
pays the contributions of disabled 
people, refugees, Olympic champions,
veterans and children in social ser-
vices. Poor people formerly covered by
the Green Card program are exempt
from premium payments on a means-
tested basis, and the government covers
their premiums. 
Impact of the Health 
Transformation Program
One of the major impacts of the Health
Transformation Program is that Turkey
has seen an increase in the breadth of
coverage, from 64 percent to 85 percent
of the population covered in 2003 to 94
percent of the population covered in
2008.252-256 See Figure 30.
The positive impact of the Health
Transformation Program (HTP) can be
seen in all dimensions of health system
performance. Between 2000 and 2008,
access to health care services has increased
and infant and maternal mortality rates
have improved. Inpatient admissions per
100 people increased from 7.5 to 12.4,
and outpatient contacts increased from
2.4 to 5.4. Infant mortality improved
from more than 30 deaths per 1,000 live
births to 20 deaths per 1,000 live births,
and maternal mortality improved from 70
per 100,000 births to 19.5 per 100,000
live births.257 Patient satisfaction has dra-
matically increased from 39.5 percent in
2000 to 66.5 percent in 2007.258 259
Total health expenditure as a percent of
GDP has also increased from 4.9 percent
in 2000 to 6.3 percent in 2008. Out-of-
pocket expenditure on health decreased
from 28 percent to 20 percent over this
time period, and the number of house-
holds driven into poverty by out-of-pock-
et medical expenses was halved as seen in
Figure 31.260 261 262
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were hired to supplement the ranks of
existing civil servants. The other main
source of cost was information technology
(though even here, expenses were modest
compared to the major investments in IT
seen in other single-payer systems, such as
England’s National Health Service). 
Best estimates from interviews and
external sources are illustrated in Figure
32. In total, from 2003 to 2009, it was
estimated that Turkey devoted an addi-
tional 0.2 percent of total health system
expenditures to system reform and man-
agement capacity in order to accomplish
the changes required in the Health
Transformation Program. This is equiva-
lent to $326.4 million, but the estimate
applies across both payers and providers
as well as central systems. One-time costs
(specifically, the design of payment mech-
anisms, IT systems and external consult-
ants) account for $80 million. 
The incremental cost of system reform
and building management capacity in
Turkey was very small, primarily because
existing institutions were so strong and
reforms were focused on streamlining the
pre-reform system. 
System Reform and Management
Capacity Costs
Turkey is a unique case when it comes to
understanding system reform and manage-
ment capacity costs. Turkey’s reform efforts
have focused on consolidating to a single
payer with monopoly power, and thereby
eliminating unnecessary duplication of
transactions within the system. Turkey also
possesses strong institutions, with large,
powerful and capable government minis-
tries. These two factors combined mean
that administration costs have been kept
low in the new system, and that unbun-
dling the costs of the reform from existing
costs is complex. Indeed, interviewees
explained that this was never seen as a pri-
ority; it was a question of how to make
optimal use of existing resources, rather
than a need to allocate additional resources. 
Specifically, as the four parallel public
payers have been combined, duplication
has been eliminated and existing employ-
ees have remained within the system.
Interviewees explained that a small num-
ber of individuals with specific expertise
Turkey has seen an increase
in the breadth of coverage, from
64 percent to 85 percent of the
population covered in 2003 to
94 percent of the population
covered in 2008.
* Estimate from interviews applies to whole system, including provision
Source: Interviews 
ensure financial self-sustainability, but
SGK itself has few incentives for reaching
financial equilibrium.265
Like many countries, Turkey faces the
problem of an aging population. This
drives up health care use, and shifts the
disease burden toward chronic diseases
that necessitate greater continuity of care,
often at a higher cost. In addition, a high-
er reliance on more sophisticated technol-
ogy may lead to a net increase in fixed
costs within the system.266
Where Next?
Over the course of the reform period,
Turkey saw a significant acceleration in
fiscal expenditure toward the health sec-
tor, though total health expenditure as a
share of GDP stayed relatively constant.
This is illustrated in Figure 33.
Today, SGK faces significant financial
challenges, with a substantial deficit.263 264
The recent economic crisis is expected to
aggravate this trend. SGK offers a gener-
ous benefits package with inadequate
demand management, and it possesses
limited strategic purchasing capabilities.
The Turkish government is obliged to
finance the fiscal gap created by SGK to
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The case studies presented in Chapter 3—as well as thehistories of the health systems of Rwanda, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand outlined in the annex—teach valuable
lessons: invest in institutions early, note that the required
investment can be relatively small and know what to look
out for during the implementation process. 
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusions
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In low-income countries with signifi-
cant capacity and capability gaps, system
reform and management capacity costs
received greater attention, with mixed
results. In Ghana, leaders acknowledged
that implementation challenges were not
sufficiently considered at the right time,
during the design phase, leading to greater
difficulties down the line. Specifically, the
design choice for risk pooling at a district
level meant greater demand for already
scarce capabilities. Furthermore, this may
have been compounded by weak central
control and accountability mechanisms,
which led to the misappropriation of cen-
trally provided funds. 
The experience of Ghana contrasts
strongly with that of the Indian state of
Andhra Pradesh. The Aarogyasri Trust is
focused on providing catastrophic protec-
tion to poor communities.270 The chal-
lenges of implementation were factored
into the design of Andhra Pradesh’s sys-
tem. There was an explicit decision not to
collect revenues directly from beneficiar-
ies, but rather to fund the system through
taxation. The reason was that the transac-
tion costs of demand-side financing
would likely exceed the income it would
generate. Nevertheless, a system of enroll-
ment was developed because coverage is
capped at $4,300 per beneficiary during
the course of any given year.271 Significant
investment was made in interactive tech-
nology (IT) systems to ensure that spend-
ing would remain within this limit and
that there would be strong accountability
for expenditures. 
Required Investment Is 
Relatively Small
Costing of the system reform and man-
agement capacity was undertaken in four
of the eight systems profiled (Andhra
Pradesh, Chile, Ghana and Turkey).
Historically, system reform and manage-
ment capacity costs have not been
methodically collected or published, 
making it difficult to peg the costs of 
this aspect of the transition to UHC. 
This analysis reconstructs the costs from
the bottom up, with the assistance of
those at the center of reform during the
Invest in Building Institutions Early
Leaders at the center of health reforms in
case-study countries suggested that system
reform and management capacity costs
are sometimes overlooked, occasionally
actively de-prioritized, or given insuffi-
cient resources and management atten-
tion. Technical capacity appeared to have
a significant influence on the degree of
focus on these costs. In middle-income
countries where technical capacity and
capability are greater, the focus on system
reform and management capacity
appeared to be lower. Here, there may
have been a belief that officials in the
ministry of health would make the neces-
sary changes—and an expectation that
they would do so successfully. In hind-
sight, reform leaders consistently
expressed the wish that they had focused
on institution-building earlier in the
reform process, and paid more attention
to implementation issues. 
As a consequence of these dynamics, in
both Chile and Turkey, reform has been
an iterative process, with the functions and
capabilities of the new payer organiza-
tions and regulators evolving over time.
In Chile, the national payer, El Fondo
Nacional de Salud (FONASA), gradually
transformed its role from that of a
“national accountant” principally charged
with disbursing funds to providers to that
of a proactive payer that sought to secure
better provider performance and an
enhanced patient experience. The scope
and depth of the regulation of both
FONASA and the private insurers
(known as “ISAPREs”) was extended
from the 1990s through 2003.267 268 In
Turkey, the consolidation of four separate
payers dedicated to particular segments of
the population into a single national
payer (the Social Security Institution or
SGK) evolved over five years, with joint
oversight between the Ministry of Health
and the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security, initially building on existing
benefits packages and reimbursement sys-
tems.269 Today, funds still flow from the
ministry of health directly to public
providers. This might suggest a further
stage of reform to come. 
In low-income countries 
with significant capacity and
capability gaps, system reform
and management capacity costs
received greater attention, with
mixed results.
63
its system. For Andhra Pradesh, the figure
is 5.1 percent. In both cases, public health
expenditure started from a very low base.
The absolute figures—$115.6 million in
Ghana over six years and $60.7 million in
Andhra Pradesh over three years—can be
considered modest. Indeed, at purchasing
power parity, they represent an annual
investment of $40.5 million and $56.3
million in establishing the foundations 
of universality.
Where were Ghana’s investments
made? The largest component of system
reform and management capacity costs
here was for the creation of the purchas-
ing function at a district level. Ghana’s
design choice led to the creation of more
than 130 purchasing institutions, each
requiring investment. These also account
for much of the revenue collection costs,
as each district bears responsibility for the
enrollment of informal sector workers.
The other main sources of costs were
stewardship in the design and implemen-
tation of the program, and enablers such
as information technology and identifica-
tion cards. 
For Andhra Pradesh, the largest compo-
nents of system reform and management
capacity costs were the information tech-
nology system and the workforce required
to enroll and coordinate services to benefi-
ciaries. Although parallel structures exist
from the pilot and scale-up phases, the
system can be characterized as a single,
centralized payer. This means that Andhra
Pradesh does not face the distributed costs
seen in Ghana. Having been established in
2007, the Andhra Pradesh system has
higher annual average costs than that of
Ghana, in part because the initial outlays
(e.g., for IT) have not been depreciated in
the calculations in this analysis. 
In Ghana and Andhra Pradesh, the
investment of 5 to 6 percent of public
health expenditures has laid the founda-
tions for universality. The institutions, sys-
tems and processes in question have
enabled coverage to be extended to 85 per-
cent of the population of Andhra Pradesh,
and 45 to 70 percent of the population of
Ghana. But for donors, the concern is
absolute investment costs rather than costs
as a share of public health expenditures. 
period examined. However, there may 
be gaps in this analysis, which seeks to
provide national governments and donors
with an indication of the costs and not a
precise figure. In all cases, capital costs
have been relatively modest. For this rea-
son, the estimates here reflect full costs
and not costs depreciated over a number
of years. Note that systems transitioning
to UHC are likely to incur these costs at
the outset of the transition, and that all
estimates here have been adjusted to 2009
constant dollars.
Figure 1 in the executive summary
illustrates the findings from the costing of
system reform and management capacity.
Full details for each of the first four case
studies can be found in Chapter 3. 
To understand these costs, it is helpful
to look at them through two lenses: the
strategy and the stage of health-system
development. Ghana and Andhra Pradesh
are best examined side by side, since both
are low income, both faced weak legacy
systems and both have sought to broaden
health coverage. Chile and Turkey also
share similarities. Both countries are mid-
dle income and more advanced in their
stage of health-system development. They
have both principally been concerned
with deepening the package of services
available to their citizens and, accordingly,
their reforms have been incremental from
strong starting points. 
For Ghana and Andhra Pradesh,
health-system reform represented a signif-
icant discontinuity as health coverage was
dramatically broadened. Ghana created 
its National Health Insurance Authority,
and Andhra Pradesh established its
Aarogyasri Health Care Trust. These two
systems illustrate the initial setup costs of
new systems: they were fundamentally
different from those that preceded them
(in both cases, very limited public provi-
sion from the ministry of health, supple-
mented by high out-of-pocket payments
to private providers). 
As a consequence, these costs include
one-time investments in infrastructure to
launch the system (e.g., investment in IT).
Ghana appears to have invested approxi-
mately 6.6 percent of public health expen-
ditures over the reform period to establish
In Ghana and Andhra
Pradesh, the investment of 
5 to 6 percent of public health
expenditures has laid the 
foundations for universality. 
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Implementation Lessons 
The case studies examined reveal anumber of features that each of the
reform journeys have had in common:
Popular dissatisfaction is 
transposed through political 
leadership to positive action
Health system reform is typically
prompted by popular dissatisfaction
with the pre-reform situation. In many
case studies examined—most notably
Ghana, Andhra Pradesh, Taiwan and
Turkey—health reform featured as a
leading issue in election campaigns,
and a priority for civil society lead-
ers, prompting politicians to clearly
and publicly support reform efforts,
and granting incoming governments
a strong mandate for reform. It is pre-
cisely through political leadership that
popular dissatisfaction is transformed
into positive action.
Active and open support from
heads of government is essential
for required political capital and
intra-government alignment
Health reform typically requires
commitment from the head of the gov-
ernment, not simply from an individual
minister (such as that of health,
finance or labor). This appears to be
for three reasons. First, health system
reform requires the expenditure of sig-
nificant political capital, which only
the head of government has in suffi-
cient quantities. Second, the origins of
reform are typically negative, reflect-
ing dissatisfaction with the current
state and meaning there is typically a
lack of consensus around a positive
plan. Third, as policymakers have sug-
gested, only the head of government
would be able to resolve tensions
within the government on the right
path forward. Building this alignment
within government is thought to be a
critical step. Specifically, since health-
system reform often has significant fis-
cal implications, and since ministries
of health are thought to over-empha-
size provision rather than financing,
key players in the case studies exam-
ined here believed that political lead-
ership was essential for progress. 
It is often said that in politics, tim-
ing is everything. When is it time for
action? Political leaders may need to
consider several questions: What is
the level of economic development
and urbanization? Are there favorable
demographic conditions such as a
low dependency ratio (the ratio of
those who are not in the labor force
compared to those who are)? Is there
a sufficient degree of political open-
ness, where the state is becoming
accountable to its citizens and respon-
sive to their needs for health care? 
Reform efforts require a cadre 
of competent leaders to make
change happen
Political and official leaders need
to be capable and committed—and
to have the prospect of retaining
office for a sufficiently long period to
oversee design and implementation.
Leaders in Chile cited the catalytic
effect of small grants from the
Fulbright Program, the United States
Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Rockefeller
Foundation for leadership develop-
ment and overseas study that created
a corps of informed and experienced
leaders who implemented the reforms.
In 1999, a passionate and committed
group of “rising stars” in Ghana’s
health system came together for a
workshop on community health insur-
ance. Five years later, many of the
participants were leading the design
and implementation of the reform pro-
gram. Building a cadre of competent
leaders appears to be an essential
ingredient of success. 
Pragmatism trumps ideology 
in successful implementation. 
Pragmatism is the watchword of
implementation. Repeatedly in the
case studies examined, systems creat-
ed new payer institutions, rather than
repurposing existing institutions or
developing the functions within the
ministries of health, labor or finance.
The purpose for this did not appear
to be to accomplish a payer-provider
split. Policymakers at the center of
reform efforts suggested that it was
instead for three other reasons. The
first was ensuring that the organiza-
tions were focused on the task at
hand. The second was ensuring a 
single point of accountability for the
funds dedicated to the health system.
The third was securing the best possi-
ble talent by wrestling free of central
government restrictions on pay 
and hiring. 
1
2
3
4
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The Path Ahead
Health system reform toward universal
health coverage requires courage and
commitment. It can be a technically
tough—and perhaps even politically
treacherous—journey to undertake. Yet it
is difficult precisely because it is impor-
tant, representing a new settlement
between citizens and their governments.
It has long been established that access to
health services improves societies’ welfare.
It makes an economic contribution for
all; it diminishes impoverishment; and it
alleviates suffering. In short, it is desirable.
In all the cases examined, there was an
overwhelming belief that the situation
had improved substantially. Current
arrangements were deemed preferable to
those that preceded them, despite signifi-
cant and serious challenges that still
remained. These case studies demonstrate
that making substantial progress toward
universal health coverage is possible.
The goal of universal coverage may be
noble, but wanting to achieve it is not
enough. Making universal coverage a real-
ity demands investment in system reform
and management capacity. Careful data
collection along the way is also critical to
aid future analysis and planning. 
As the case studies in this report
demonstrate, relatively small investments
can have a catalytic effect. These invest-
ments are affordable because they are
small, and important because they are
transformative. Coverage does not have to
be extended to the whole population
immediately. Systems don’t change in a
single step, but instead make journeys to
universal coverage. 
So, progress toward universal health
coverage is desirable, possible and afford-
able. That is why the international com-
munity should support reform efforts—
through open commitment, technical
assistance and funding. Only through this
global effort can we move ourselves and
each other toward better health, more pro-
ductive lives and stronger economies in a
world that is far more interdependent than
ever before.
Relatively small investments
can have catalytic effect…
these investments are affordable
because they are small and
important because they are
transformative.
In both cases, investment has been approx-
imately $20 million per annum. With
health coverage extended to such a signifi-
cant proportion of the population, this
represents a very positive return on invest-
ment. It is a small price to pay for
progress, and one that sits well within the
grasp of both countries and the donors
that support them.
Like Ghana and Andhra Pradesh, high-
er-income Chile and Turkey both pursued
a strategy that can be characterized as
“broad then deep.” In the case of both
Chile and Turkey, it is helpful to examine
the costs of the second part of the transi-
tion to UHC: the investment in system
reform and management capacity
required to deepen the package of services
available to affected populations. In both
cases, many of the institutions, systems
and processes were already well-estab-
lished before this transition began. 
Both Chile and Turkey are middle-
income countries. Accordingly, the size of
their health sectors—and the scale of pub-
lic expenditures for health—are signifi-
cantly larger than those for either Ghana
or Andhra Pradesh. Accordingly, with rel-
atively large funding, and with costs that
are incremental, it is no surprise that the
overall costs as a share of public expendi-
tures are low. In Chile, the best estimate
is that transitioning to UHC consumed
0.9 percent of public health expenditures.
In Turkey, the best estimate is 0.2 percent
of public expenditures. Both Chile and
Turkey benefit from support from donors
such as the World Bank (which gave
Chile a $66.1million loan that had a cat-
alytic effect on reforms). The experiences
of Chile and Turkey suggest that dedicat-
ing a relatively small portion of health sys-
tem spending toward system reform and
management capacity is a wise investment
for middle-income countries to make, and
that donors have important contributions
to offer to this process.
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The Evolution of Rwanda’s 
Health System (See Figure 35) 
Rwanda’s health system prior to 1999
n Coverage and access to care. Prior to
health system reform, less than 1 per-
cent of Rwandans had coverage.280
Government officials were insured by
the Rwandaise Health Care Insurance,
and the Genocide Survivors’ Support
Fund covered medical services for the
neediest victims. The military, private
insurance and several community-based
health insurance programs covered a
very small portion of the population.281
n Provision. The public and private sectors
split provision, with nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and other out-
side organizations playing a large role.
Most patients were required to pay out
of pocket at the point of care, forcing
many to forego care altogether. In
January 1999, the primary care consul-
tation rates were at an all-time low of
0.24 visits per capita per year in the
rural population.282 283
The pilot phase of reform
n Design. In response to plummeting
health service utilization, the ministry
of health decided to develop and pilot
other options for health financing and
provider payment. The Directorate of
Health Care within the ministry creat-
ed a steering committee composed of
representatives from the central and
regional levels and external partners to
oversee the development and imple-
mentation of the pilots.284 285 286
n Pilot setup. Between January and July
1999, the ministry of health initiated
54 community-based health insurance
(CBHI) programs across three
districts.287 Each plan was required to
partner with a specific health center to
test provider payment mechanisms.
Two districts chose to have provider
payment managed jointly by the popu-
lation and the providers, and the other
chose to have it managed solely by the
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Figure 34: Distribution of Physicians in Rwanda and Other African Countries
n Disease burden and interventions. Rwanda
suffers from a high burden of commu-
nicable disease and has one of the
world’s highest disease burdens overall.
Rwanda lost 597 disability-adjusted life
years (DALYs) per 1,000 lives in 2004,
more than double the world average
and higher than nearly all of its Sub-
Saharan African peers. Infant mortality,
under-five mortality and maternal
mortality have all improved since
1995,273 but remain higher than the
Millennium Development Goal
(MDG) targets.274 
n Health system input factors. Rwanda has
one of the lowest numbers of physi-
cians per capita in Africa, a problem
further aggravated by the country’s
regional disparities (e.g., difference in
number of physicians per capita by
region). See Figure 34.275 276 277 The same
trend holds true for all types of health
professionals, of whom Rwanda has less
than half the number recommended 
by the World Health Organization
(WHO).278 A growing number of 
community health workers provide
basic care and education. The lack 
of human resources for health is 
exacerbated by poor access, with only 
52 percent of births attended by a
health professional.279
Case Study 
HEALTH SYSTEM 
REFORMS IN RWANDA
1999–2005
Summary: Rwanda piloted community-
based health insurance in three districts
beginning in 1999 and by the end of
2005 had scaled up the system nationwide.
The impact of this reform has been sub-
stantial with respect to the depth of cover-
age and also with regard to the breadth 
of coverage, which has increased from 1 
percent of the population in 2000 to 90 
percent of the population in 2009. During
the same period, maternal and under-five
mortality have also improved dramatically.
Country Profile
Rwanda is a low-income, landlocked
country in Central Africa recovering from
a catastrophic genocide that took place in
1994. It has a population of 10.4 million,
80 percent of whom live in rural areas.
Life expectancy is 55 years for men and
58 years for women. Over the past 15
years, Rwanda has made significant
progress toward restoring its economy to
pre-1994 status. The gross domestic
product (GDP) today is $4.5 billion.272
Source: World Bank Report, World Health Report 2006
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After one year of operation, 88,000
individuals had enrolled, about eight
percent of the total population across
the three districts.294 295
n Benefits package. The programs covered
a basic health center package that
included all services and drugs provid-
ed by the contracted health center. The
package also covered ambulance trans-
port to a district hospital and a limited
package of services at the hospital.296
n Purchasing. Each program reimbursed
the associated health center by capita-
tion payment. District hospitals were
paid on a per episode basis by the
District Federation of Prepayment
Schemes, which received 5 percent to
10 percent of each program’s monthly
disbursement. 
population. By July 1999, each health
center had signed contracts with the
respective CBHIs, and the district 
populations began to enroll.288 289 290
n Program stewardship. Each program was
managed by its members, who elected 
a five-person executive committee.291
Each of the three districts had a District
Federation of Prepayment Schemes that
set overall district policy. All programs
were subject to standardized bylaws and
a prepayment contract between the
programs and the providers. Extensive
training for providers and personnel
occurred regularly.292 293
n Revenue collection and enrollment. Families
paid about $4.30 to enroll, and were
entitled to benefits after a one-month
waiting period. Members paid a co-
payment of $0.17 per episode of care.
Source: Interviews; Schneider, P., and Diop, F., “Community-Based Health Insurance in Rwanda,” from Health Financing for Poor People: Resource
Mobilization and Risk Sharing; Schneider, P., Diop, F., and Bucyana, S., “Development and Implementation of Prepayment Schemes in Rwanda,”
Partnerships for Health Reform, 2000; Rwandan Ministry of Health Annual Report 2008; “Mutual Health Insurance Policy in Rwanda,” Rwanda Ministry
of Health, Dec. 2004; Musango, L., et al., “Rwanda’s health system and sickness insurance schemes,” International Social Security Review, 2006
Figure 35: Timeline of Health System Reform in Rwanda
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Figure 36: Reformed Rwandan Health System Structure
n Revenue collection and enrollment.
Enrollment remains contingent upon
premium payments at the family level.
Premiums vary from program to pro-
gram and range between $4.30 and
$19.90. Co-payment also varies
between $0.17 and $0.16 per disease
episode or between 5 percent and 25
percent of the real cost of care. The
government covers the cost of premi-
ums and co-payments for indigents
and other vulnerable groups.302 303
n Benefits package. The benefits package
comprises two parts: the Minimum
Package of Activities (MPA) and the
Complementary Package of Activities
(CPA). The MPA covers all services and
Scaling Up the Community-Based Health
Insurance (CBHI) Programs
n Lessons learned from the pilot. The
Ministry of Health and its partners
conducted a rigorous evaluation of the
pilot phase and held a workshop in
2000 to discuss how lessons learned
could be applied during the scale-up.
Primary recommendations included
adapting and enlarging the benefits
package, developing fee-for-service
reimbursement for hospitals, and
strengthening organizational and finan-
cial management in health facilities.297
n Scale-up. By 2002, pressure was mount-
ing to extend the pilot nationwide, and
President Paul Kagame announced the
CBHIs as a core element of the gov-
ernment agenda. Rwanda’s Ministry of
Health, Ministry of Local Affairs and
external partners created a strategy for
scale-up and began to build the techni-
cal capacity required (e.g., country-
level systems, communications, train-
ing materials and instructors, etc.).
Less than three years later, CBHI infra-
structure covered the entire country.298
Reform design and implementation in
Rwanda have relied on significant techni-
cal and budgetary support from donors,
including the governments of the United
States, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany
and Norway, as well as the WHO, the
International Labour Organization (ILO)
and the Global Fund, amongst others.299
Key features of Rwanda’s reformed 
health system (See Figure 36)
n Payer structure and purchasing. Today
about 85 percent of Rwandans are cov-
ered by a CBHI. An additional five
percent are covered by private insurers,
the military, the government or the
Genocide Survivors’ Support Fund.
Most CBHIs and other insurers pur-
chase services from providers using a
fee-for-service method, though some
CBHIs still use a capitated system.300 301
drugs provided at the health centers,
including pre- and post-natal care, vac-
cinations, family planning, minor surgi-
cal operations, and essential and generic
drugs. The CPA covers a limited num-
ber of services at the district hospitals,
including the cost of hospitalization,
caesarian operations minor and major
surgical operations, medical imaging
and all diseases afflicting children up to
five years old. As of 2006, the CPA ben-
efits package was extended to cover
select services in national hospitals.304 305
n Provision. Primary and secondary care is
delivered through public health centers
and district hospitals, government-assist-
ed health facilities and private health
Source: Interviews; Schneider, P., and Diop, F., “Community-Based Health Insurance in
Rwanda,” from Health Financing for Poor People: Resource Mobilization and Risk Sharing;
Schneider, P., Diop, F., and Bucyana, S., “Development and Implementation of Prepayment
Schemes in Rwanda,” Partnerships for Health Reform, 2000; Rwandan Ministry of Health
Annual Report 2008; “Mutual Health Insurance Policy in Rwanda,” Rwanda Ministry of Health,
Dec. 2004; Musango, L., et al., “Rwanda’s health system and sickness insurance schemes,”
International Social Security Review, 2006
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facilities. Government-assisted health
facilities, which account for about 40
percent of primary and secondary care
in Rwanda, are run by NGOs, religious
groups and other third parties, but are
partially funded by the government.
Private health facilities are limited and
mostly located in Kigali. Records indi-
cate the number of private physicians
there grew from 69 in 1999 to 405 
in 2001. Twelve Regional Health
Authorities administer district-level pro-
vision. Tertiary care is offered at four
hospitals in Rwanda, three of them
public and one private.306 307 308 309
Impact of the Health System Reforms
n Breadth of coverage. Rwanda has seen
dramatic growth in the breadth of its
health coverage. It served less than 1
percent of its population in 2000, and
more than 90 percent in 2009, as indi-
cated in Figure 37.310 311 312 313
n Out-of-pocket expenditures. Rwanda has
seen a decline and rebound in out-of-
pocket expenditures, as illustrated in
Figure 38.
n Depth and quality of coverage. Depth of
coverage, utilization and key health
indicators have improved since the
introduction of the CBHIs, though it
should be noted that outcomes are due
to many changes in the health system
and economy, and that the CBHIs
are only one contributing factor.
Beneficiaries of the programs have
access to medical services for a solid set
of primary and secondary conditions 
at the local, district and national level.
Annual curative visits per capita among
members of a CBHI are 1.2 to 1.6,
while that figure is 0.2 for non-mem-
bers, suggesting that coverage provides
increased access to care.314 Maternal
mortality has nearly halved, down from
1,400 deaths per 100,000 live births in
2000 to 750 deaths per 100,000 live
births in 2005. During the same peri-
od, under-five mortality has improved
from 196 deaths per 1,000 live births
to 112 deaths per 1,000 live births.315 316
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Source: Interviews; Schneider, P., and Diop, F., “Community-Based Health Insurance in Rwanda,”
from Health Financing for Poor People: Resource Mobilization and Risk Sharing; Schneider, P.,
Diop, F., and Bucyana, S., “Development and Implementation of Prepayment Schemes in
Rwanda,” Partnerships for Health Reform, 2000; Rwandan Ministry of Health Annual Report
2008; “Mutual Health Insurance Policy in Rwanda,” Rwanda Ministry of Health, Dec. 2004;
Musango, L., et al., “Rwanda’s health system and sickness insurance schemes,” International
Social Security Review, 2006; interviews; ILO Social Health Protection Report, 2007
Figure 37: Impact on Coverage
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Figure 38: Out-of-Pocket Expenditures & Correlation of THE to GDP in Rwanda
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Case Study 
HEALTH SYSTEM REFORMS 
IN SOUTH KOREA
1997–2000
Summary: In 1997, South Korea
replaced a fragmented payer landscape
with a government-run, single-payer sys-
tem. This reform deepened the benefits
package and broadened coverage from 94
percent of the population then to 99 per-
cent today. Since reforms began, out-of-
pocket expenditure as a proportion of total
health expenditure has decreased from
54.9 percent to 38.1 percent, while
spending on social insurance has increased
from 28.4 percent to 41.6 percent.
1963 and 1989, the breadth and depth 
of coverage increased in a step-wise 
manner by population segment. By 1990,
94 percent of the population was covered
by more than 350 insurers. In 1997, 
the government created the National
Health Insurance Corporation, consoli-
dating the fragmented system, standard-
izing and deepening the benefits package,
and broadening coverage to the remain-
ing portion of the population. The 
evolution of the system is described in
Figure 39.319-324
South Korea’s health system prior to 1997 
n Stewardship. The Ministry of Health
and Welfare (MoHW) sets overall
health sector policy and sets fee 
Country Profile
South Korea is a high-income country
with a population of 48.6 million and a
gross domestic product (GDP) of $929
billion. Life expectancy at birth is 79
years.317 South Korea suffers from a bur-
den of non-communicable disease.
Cancer and cardiovascular disease are 
the leading causes of death.318
Overview of South Korea’s 
Journey Toward Universal 
Health Coverage
South Korea’s transition to universal
health coverage began in 1963, when 
the Health Insurance Law was enacted,
mandating universal coverage. Between
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Source: Universal Health Care Coverage in Korea,” Anderson, Health Affairs, 1989; “Health Care Reform in South Korea: Success or Failure?” Lee,
Amer. J. Public Health, Jan 2003; “National Health Insurance Program in Korea 2001,” National Health Insurance Corporation of the Republic of
Korea, Aug 2001; “Thirty years of national health insurance in South Korea: lessons for achieving universal health care care coverage,” Kwon,
Health Policy and Planning, June 2008; “Payment system reform for health care providers in Korea,” Kwon, Health Policy and Planning, 2003
Figure 39: Timeline of Health System Reform in South Korea 
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Figure 40: Reformed South Korean Health System Structureschedules for providers. The govern-
ment also funds or subsidizes most 
insurers.325 326 327
n Payer structure and coverage. The Feder-
ation of Korean Medical Insurance
Societies administers all insurers (more
than 350) and processes all claims.
Private insurers cover 90 percent of the
population, and the government
directly insures a portion of those not
covered privately. Each insurer covers a
well-defined population segment 
based on workplace and geography.
Beneficiaries have no choice of insurer.
The benefits packages are largely con-
sistent across insurers, but provide rela-
tively limited coverage.328 329 330
n Reimbursement and payment mechanisms.
Providers were reimbursed on a fee-for-
service basis. Prices are set by the
MoHW, and claims are processed by
the Federation of Korean Medical
Insurance. Beneficiaries pay premiums
and co-payments.331 332 333
n Provision. Private physicians and hospi-
tals provide the majority of care.
Patients have access to all providers,
though rural residents must visit a 
primary care physician before being
referred to a hospital.334 335
Key Features of South Korea’s Reformed
Health System (See Figure 40)
n Stewardship. The MoHW sets overall
health sector policy and the overall
budget, including the reimbursement
ceiling for the system. The ministry
also monitors the National Health
Insurance Corporation (NHIC) and
Health Insurance Review Agency
(HIRA).336
n Payer structure and benefits package. The
NHIC is a not-for-profit, single payer
covering more than 98 percent of the
population. The benefits package is
comprehensive, including almost all
inpatient and outpatient services, den-
tal care, traditional medicine, prescrip-
tion drugs and preventive services.337
n Payment mechanisms. Providers are reim-
bursed through a fee-for-service mech-
anism, though moving to a diagnosis-
related group (DRG) system is current-
ly under consideration. The HIRA is
responsible for medical fee review and
evaluating performance and economy
of provision.338
n Provision. More than 90 percent of all
health services in South Korea are 
provided by private facilities. More
than 80 percent of physicians are spe-
cialists, compared to 50 percent or 
less in other high-income nations.
Referrals are required from a primary
care physician to receive secondary 
and tertiary care.339 340
n Depth of coverage. The standardized,
comprehensive benefits package offered
by the NHIC is significantly deeper
than many of the benefits packages
that existed before 1997.343 344 Over the
past 20 years, South Korea’s health
infrastructure has grown tremendously,
utilization has increased and health
outcomes have improved. The number
of physicians per capita has doubled
from 8 in 1989 to 16 in 2004, and the
number of physician visits per capita
has increased from 6 to 11 over the
same period. Infant mortality has
improved from 12 deaths per 1,000
live births in 1989 to 4 deaths per
1,000 live births in 2005.345 346
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Figure 41: Impact on Coverage 
Impact of the health system reforms
n Breadth of coverage. South Korea has
seen an increase in the breadth of cov-
erage from less than 9 percent in 1977,
to nearly 94 percent in 1990, to 99
percent in 2005, as illustrated in
Figure 41.341 342
n Out-of-pocket expenditures. South Korea
has seen a long decline in out-of-pock-
et expenditures, as illustrated in 
Figure 42.
South Korea has seen a 
long decline in out-of-pocket
expenditures…
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Figure 42: Out-of-Pocket Expenditures and Correlation of Total Health Expenditure to GDP in South Korea
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n Financing. Total health expenditure as a
percent of GDP has increased from 4.2
percent in 1997 to 6.6 percent in
2007, in line with expectations based
on GDP (see Figure 43).347 348
Out-of-pocket expenditure as a propor-
tion of total health expenditure
decreased from 54.9 percent in 1995
to 38.1 percent in 2004. Spending on
social insurance increased from 28.4
percent to 41.6 percent during that
time (see Figure 44)349 350
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Figure 44: Breakdown of South Korea’s Total Health Expenditure Over Time
Source: Kwon, S. Thirty years of national health insurance in South Korea: lessons for achieving
universal health care coverage. Health Policy and Planning 2009;24:63–71
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Figure 43: Change in Total Health Expenditure Over Time 
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Country Profile
The island of Taiwan lies off the south-
eastern coast of China. It has a gross
domestic product (GDP) of $698.6 
billion, similar to the GDPs of Australia
and Poland.351 It has a population of
23.2 million, with 81 percent of 
residents living in urban areas. Life
expectancy is 79 years. Taiwan suffers
from a burden of non-communicable
and chronic diseases. Cancer and 
cardiovascular disease are the leading
causes of death. Total health expen-
diture accounts for 6.1 percent 
of GDP.352 
Case Study
HEALTH SYSTEM REFORMS 
IN TAIWAN
1995–2001
Summary: In 1995, Taiwan replaced 
a fragmented payer system with a 
government-run, single-payer one. 
This reform broadened coverage from 
59 percent in 1995 to 99 percent today.
All beneficiaries are entitled to a compre-
hensive benefits package, and patient sat-
isfaction with the system has increased
from 33 percent to 79 percent.
By the end of 1995, 
92 percent of the 
population is enrolled
Low-Income 
Household Insurance 
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Department of Health 
created
Farmer’s 
Insurance created
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1990
National Health 
Insurance Bill passed 
in Parliament 
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Global budget
implementation
complete for several
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including hospitals 
2002
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of “health insurance for all 
by year 2000”
1986
Martial law
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1986
National Health 
Insurance created 
1995
Bureau of National 
Health Insurance 
created to administer
the scheme
99 percent of the 
population is enrolled
2001
59 percent of Taiwan 
citizens are covered by 
a health insurance 
scheme 
1985
Source: “National Health Insurance and Technology Adoption: Evidence from Taiwan,” Shin-Yi Chou, et al, Contemporary Economic Policy, 2004;
“Does Universal Health Insurance Make Health Care Unaffordable? Lessons from Taiwan,” Jui-Fen Rachel Lu, et al., Health Affairs, 2003; “The
healthcare system in Taiwan,” Delon Wu, World Hospitals and Health Services; “Taiwan’s New National Health Insurance Program: Genesis and
Experience So Far,” Tsung-Mei Cheng, Health Affairs, 2003; “Health Systems in East Asia: What Can Developing Countries Learn from Japan and
the Asian Tigers?” Adam Wagstaff, World Bank, 2005; “National Health Insurance System,” Taiwan Health Care Reform Foundation, thrf.org.tw;
“Taiwan Takes Fast Track to Universal Health Care,” T. R. Reid, Apr 2008, npr.org; “The Emerging Health Care Market in Taiwan: An Economic
Analysis,” Yanrui Qu, Asia Research Center, Apr 1999
Figure 45: Timeline of Health System Reform in Taiwan
Overview of Taiwan’s Journey
Toward Universal Health Coverage
Taiwan’s transition to universal health
coverage began in 1950 with the creation
of Labor Insurance. The next 40 years
saw a step-wise broadening and deepen-
ing of the benefits package, with multiple
insurance programs established to cover
specific population segments. By 1985,
59 percent of the population was covered.
In 1995, the government created National
Health Insurance to expand the breadth
of coverage, improve quality and contain
costs. By 2001, 99 percent of the popula-
tion was enrolled and had access to care.
The evolution of the system is described
in Figure 45.353-360 
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Figure 46: Reformed Taiwanese Health System Structure Taiwan’s Health System Prior to 1995
n Stewardship. The Department of Health
sets overall sector policy and provides
basic inputs to public hospitals.361
n Payer structure and coverage. Thirteen dis-
tinct insurance programs managed by
different entities cover approximately
59 percent of the population (ten pro-
grams make up the majority of this
coverage).362 363 364 The four programs
providing the majority of coverage are
Labor Insurance, Low-Income
Household Insurance, Farmer’s
Insurance and Government Employee
Insurance.365 Each has a unique benefits
package, claims and billing process and
set of prices. Private insurance is rare.
Only Government Employee Insurance
covers dependents, leaving 41 percent
of the population uninsured. In 1992,
more than 91 percent of children under
14 and more than 42 percent of elderly
people were uninsured.366 367
n Reimbursement and payment mechanisms.
Providers were reimbursed on a fee-for-
service basis. Beneficiaries paid payroll-
based premiums.368 
n Provision. Primary care is provided pri-
marily by private clinics and health
facilities. Seventy percent of these
organizations contract with the 13
health insurance programs. Secondary
and tertiary care is split between public
hospitals (which provide one-third of
care) and private hospitals (which 
provide two-thirds of care, with 85 per-
cent of private facilities contracting
with the health insurance programs).
Beneficiaries of the insurance programs
must visit providers that are under con-
tract by their insurance programs.369 370
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n Benefits package. The benefits package is
comprehensive and includes inpatient
services, outpatient services, dental
services, traditional Chinese medicine,
prescription drugs, diagnostics, treat-
ment for mental illness, home health
care and some preventive health servic-
es.375 376
n Enrollment. Beneficiaries pay premiums
to enroll. Each premium is calculated
based on taxable income, the beneficia-
ry’s number of dependents and the
share of the contribution that must be
made by the beneficiary (as opposed to
the employer or the government,
which also contribute). Between 1995
Key features of Taiwan’s reformed health
system (See Figure 46)
n Stewardship. Taiwan’s Department of
Health sets overall sector policy and
oversees the Bureau of National Health
Insurance (BNHI).371 372
n Payer structure and coverage. The
National Health Insurance program is
a government-run, mandatory insur-
ance plan that provides coverage for 99
percent of the population. All citizens,
their dependents, foreigners with resi-
dent permits and their dependents are
covered. The scope of private insurance
is very small.373 374
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Figure 47: Impact on Coverage and 2002, the premium rate was 4.25
percent of taxable income; this rate
increased to 4.55 percent in 2002 and
to 5.17 percent in 2010.377 
n Payment mechanisms. Providers are pri-
marily paid via global budgets and fees
for service.378 379 For some conditions, a
resource-based relative value scale is
used, and diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs) are phasing in.380 Payment
based on performance is being tested
for physicians treating breast cancer
therapy, diabetes, asthma and hyper-
tension.381 Global budgets apply to
dental care, traditional Chinese medi-
cine, clinics and hospitals.382 383 384
Co-payments are required for most
medical services and vary by service type,
location of care and whether the patient
has a referral. Catastrophic diseases, child
delivery, preventive health services and
medical services in select geographies do
not require co-payments. Low-income
families, children under three years of age
and veterans are exempt from making co-
payments.385-389
n Provision. Taiwan has 1.6 physicians per
1,000 people and 6 hospital beds per
1,000 people. Nearly all primary care
providers are private, and 90 percent of
them contract with the BNHI.
Secondary and tertiary care is split
between public and private hospitals.
Thirty percent to 35 percent of hospi-
tal beds and 15 percent of hospitals are
public.390 391 More than 98 percent of all
hospitals contract with the BNHI.392 393
No referrals are required to receive hos-
pital medical services, and patients can
visit any provider.394 395
n Enablers. Taiwan relies on a sophisticated
information technology and smart card
system to identify patients and track
medical records. The smart cards store
medical information related to prescrip-
tions, diagnostics, routine treatments,
catastrophic illnesses, organ donation
and palliative care.396 397 398 399
Impact of the Health System Reforms
n Breadth of coverage. Taiwan has seen an
increase in its breadth of health insur-
ance provision, covering 59 percent of
the population in 1995 and 99 percent
in 2001 (see Figure 47).400 401 402
n Depth of coverage. The National Health
Insurance benefits package is compre-
hensive, replacing the distinct benefits
packages provided by the previous sys-
tem of fragmented payers.403 The quali-
ty of services is reinforced by the intro-
duction of DRGs and pay-for-perform-
ance reimbursement, and utilization
has increased. A study conducted
shortly after the introduction of
National Health Insurance found that
formerly uninsured beneficiaries had
increased their outpatient visits to
equal the number of visits made by
those who were previously insured.404
Patient satisfaction has increased from
33 percent to 79 percent.405
Thailand’s health system prior to 2001 
n Stewardship. The Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH) was responsible for
setting overall health sector policy and
subsidizing the public health insurance
programs. The ministry also provides
basic inputs to public health facili-
ties.409-415 
n Payer structure and coverage. Seventy 
percent of the population was covered
by some form of health insurance in
1995. The Medical Welfare Scheme 
for the poor was the largest program,
covering 44 percent of the population.
The Social Security Scheme, Workers
Compensation Scheme, Civil Servants
Medical Benefit Scheme and private
insurers mainly covered the formal 
sector. Informal sector workers 
could join the Voluntary Health 
Card Scheme for about $14 per year.
Payments for health services could 
be waived for the very poorest at 
the discretion of public health 
staff.416-420
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Country Profile
Thailand is a lower-middle-income coun-
try with a population of 67.4 million. Life
expectancy at birth is 69 years.406 The
country suffers from a split burden of com-
municable and non-communicable diseases.
The top three causes of death are cardio-
vascular disease, cancer and HIV/AIDS.407
Overview of Thailand’s Journey
Toward Universal Health Coverage
Thailand’s transition to universal health
coverage began in 1975 with the creation
of the Medical Welfare Scheme to cover
the poor. Between 1975 and 1992, the
Thai government established a series of
health insurance programs for specific
population segments. By 1995, 70 percent
of the population was covered by some
form of insurance. In 2001, the govern-
ment established the Universal Coverage
Scheme to cover the informal sector.
Preexisting payers for the formal sector
were not reformed. The evolution of the
system is described in Figure 48.408
Summary: Thailand introduced its
Universal Coverage Scheme in 2001 to
cover the informal sector, adding to a
fragmented system of payers that previous-
ly only covered the formal sector. The
impact of the reform can be seen in the
breadth, depth and financing of coverage.
Breadth of coverage increased from 70
percent of the population in 1995 to
nearly 100 percent today.
The benefits package in the Universal
Coverage Scheme is quite comprehensive,
and beneficiaries are entitled to pay no
more than 30 baht ($0.84) per medical
visit. Total health expenditure as a per-
cent of GDP has remained constant, but
impoverishment due to payment for
health services has decreased substantially,
from 18.3 percent before 2001 to 8.0
percent in 2004. 
Thai-Rak-Thai (TRT) Party wins
national election, having 
campaigned on a health care
platform of “30 baht for all” 
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Source: “Thailand: Universal Health Care Coverage Through Pluralistic Approaches,” ILO Subregional Office for East Asia; “Future prospects of vol-
untary health insurance in Thailand, Supakankunti, Health Policy and Planning, 2000; “Knowledge-based changes to health systems: the Thai experi-
ence in policy development,” Tangcharoensathien et al., Bulletin of the WHO, Oct 2004; “Early Results from Thailand’s 30 Baht Health Reform:
Something to Smile About,” Damrongplasit et al., Health Affairs, 2009; “The evolution of Thailand’s health system after three crises, three adjust-
ments, and three decades of growth,” Nitayarumphong et al., IDRC; “Universal Coverage in the Land of Smiles: Lessons from Thailand’s 30 Baht
Health Reforms,” Hughes, Health Affairs, 2007
Figure 48: Timeline of Health System Reform in Thailand 
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Figure 49: Reformed Thai Health System Structure
n Reimbursement and payment mechanisms.
Each program had its own mode 
of provider reimbursement. The
Voluntary Health Card Scheme, Civil
Servants Medical Benefit Scheme and
private insurers purchased services
using a fee-for-service mechanism. The
Social Security Scheme and Workers
Compensation Scheme used capitation.
Finally, the Medical Welfare Scheme
paid hospitals based on a combination
per-capita and diagnoses-related group
(DRG) system, and provided a global
budget for primary care to individual
provinces.421
Key Features of Thailand’s Reformed Health
System (See Figure 49)
n Stewardship. The MoPH is responsible
for setting overall health sector policy
and continues to subsidize the public
insurance programs. The ministry will
transfer most public health facility
duties to local governments by the 
end of 2010.424
n Payer structure and benefits package.
Nearly 100 percent of the population
is covered by some form of health
insurance. The National Health
Security Office administers the
Universal Coverage Scheme and regis-
ters providers. The Universal Coverage
Scheme covers about 45 million peo-
ple, 67 percent of the population, and
provides a fairly comprehensive bene-
fits package. The 30 Baht Scheme
within the Universal Coverage Scheme
entitles each beneficiary to pay no
more than 30 baht ($0.84) per medical
visit, including drugs.425 426 427
n Payment mechanisms. The Universal
Coverage Scheme uses capitation to
purchase services from providers at all
levels of care. Weighted DRGs are also
used in some places. The Social
Security Scheme uses capitation for
non-work-related medical problems,
while the Workers Compensation
Scheme uses a fee-for-service mecha-
nism for work-related medical needs.
The Civil Servants Medical Benefit
Scheme uses a combination of DRGs
and fee-for-service payments, and pri-
vate insurers continue to use the fee-
for-service mechanism.428 429
n Provision. The MoPH provides almost
70 percent of all hospital services and
beds in Thailand. Provincial and
national hospitals are the only ones
offering specialist medical services.
Primary care units are the contracting
unit for purchasing from the Universal
Coverage Scheme. Each patient
enrolled in the Universal Coverage
Scheme must register with a public
health unit in the local residential area
n Provision. For primary care, informal
sector workers and low-income benefi-
ciaries had to visit public primary care
units. Private sector employees used
providers contracted with the Social
Security Scheme. All other beneficiaries
could choose providers freely. Referrals
to secondary and tertiary care were
required for beneficiaries of the
Medical Welfare and Voluntary Health
Card Schemes.422 423
to be used as the primary point of care.
Outside of the Universal Coverage
Scheme, the popularity of private
providers is growing among those who
can afford them.430 431
Impact of the Health System Reforms 
(See Figure 50)
n Breadth of coverage. Thailand has seen an
increase in its breadth of health cover-
age, from offering coverage to 70 per-
cent of the population in 1995 to near-
ly 100 percent today.432
n Out-of-pocket expenditures. Thailand has
seen a long-term decline in out-of-
pocket expenditures, as illustrated in
Figure 51.
n Depth of coverage. The depth of health
coverage has increased substantially for
the newly insured, and access to care
has increased in that population. In
2001, the outpatient contact rate for
the then-uninsured was 60.9 percent.
By 2005, the outpatient contact rate
had increased to 73.3 percent. Health
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outcomes have also improved: infant
mortality has improved from 11 deaths
per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 7
deaths per 1,000 live births in 2006,
and under-five mortality has improved
from 13 deaths in 1,000 to 8 deaths in
1,000 over the same period.
n Financing. Total health expenditure as a
percent of GDP has remained fairly
constant over the period of reform, but
has tripled in absolute dollars. Out-of-
pocket expenditure as a proportion of
total health expenditure has decreased
from 33.1 percent in 2001 to 25.9 per-
cent in 2007, and government expen-
diture has increased from 51.3 percent
to 58.8 percent over the same period
(see Figure 52). Impoverishment due
to payment for health services has
decreased substantially since the intro-
duction of the Universal Coverage
Scheme, dropping from 18.3 percent
before 2001 to 8.0 percent in 2004.
Impoverishment due to 
payment for health services has
decreased substantially since the
introduction of the Universal
Coverage Scheme…
Health insurance coverage rate in Thailand 
Percent 
Health insurance coverage rate in select peers 
Percent, latest available over 2005-07 
19931975 2004200019951963 2007*
Thailand
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Japan
Singapore
* Data from ILO report published in 2007; date for data not provided 
Source: Hughes, D. & Leethongdee, S. 2007. Universal Coverage in the Land of Smiles: Lessons from Thailand’s 30 Baht Health Reforms. 
Health Affairs 26(4):9.
Figure 50: As coverage increases, Thailand’s health insurance coverage rate is close to that of Asian peers
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Figure 52: Changes in Thailand’s Health Financing Over Time
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Figure 51: Out-of-Pocket Expenditures and Correlation of THE to GDP in Thailand
Source: WHO National Health Accounts; OECD; McKinsey analysis
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